Recent work on OBEs and the implications for NDEs

Several blogs have commented on a flurry of news stories about experimental research regarding out-of-body experiences published in the recent issue of the journal Science (see here and here for blog discussions; for a cool video visit Neurophilosopher here). Apparently, scientists can create an out-of-body experience. I believe the research has serious implications for near-death experiences, and philosophers views on personal identity and immortality.

Since Richard Moody published Life to Life in 1975, many philosophers and theologians have used his account of people's near-death experiences as proof for an afterlife, or immortality. Some people have gone so far as to say that his accounts provide scientific proof of immortality. The new data seem to show that Moody's accounts are just that, accounts of personal experience with no metaphysical implications at all.

(What I find pretty cool is that when researchers took subjects from one spot in the room and told them to return to where they were standing, the subjects moved to the place where they believed they had the experience, the location of the out of body moment.)

The problem of identity (on the cheap!)

Philosophy Now published an article on the problem of personal identity (here).

The author mentions Parfit's theory. He does so in an odd light. The author believes that Parfit is a spiritualist. He also says, "Parfit’s vision of the present state of mankind is of beings walking in separate glass tunnels, ie seeing themselves as atomistic individuals." I'm not sure what to make of the statement or the author's intent to cast Parfit in an eastern light.

Regardless of the author's bastardization of Parfit, he has some interesting comments at the end of his piece. He asks us to consider whether the "self," the what we are, is merely a social convention. The "self," what we refer to when we say "I," "me," "we," or "us," is the same thing as the government's assigning speed limits to certain roads. The words we use to refer to our "selves" is just an arbitrary label.

The idea seems almost too wild to take seriously. But is there a reasonable argument for the claim? The argument will conflate a lot of issues about indexicals, reference, and identity, but it seems one can work.

The referent of "I" or "me" is the person speaking. Two different people can use the word "I" or "me" and refer to him/herself. Any word that can refer to two different things indiscriminately are mere labels. So, "I" or "me" are labels. Labels tell us nothing deeply interesting about objects or events. Thus, "I" or "me" tell us nothing deeply interesting about people.

What's an objection to this "argument?" If we want to know something about what a person is, then we shouldn't be concerned with the labels we use. We should want an explanation or - better - an argument for what a person is. A person seems to be something more than merely a label we place on him/her. For example, they exist, their cognizant of their environment, etc. It seems to follow that there is something deeply interesting about people.

Early Hominids Co-existed

This story has been around a while, but I thought I'd report it here if people weren't aware of it. Also, I'm pretty impressed that geologists at the University of Utah had a hand in the discovery.

My worry about the find is that creation scientists and advocates of intelligent design will use the discovery against evolutionary theory. I imagine that they'll argue since evolution isn't linear, it follows that evolutionary theory is just a theory, i.e., false.

Clearly, the argument is a non sequitur. But one can imagine that they would argue something similar to this.

51st Philosophy Carnival

Carnival is here...

There is an addiction that doesn't exist

I'm pretty sure this is wrong, wrong, wrong. The person hasn't spent much time around me. Clearly, my internet usage gets in the way of completing my dissertation, etc.

Umnh, I should stop writing now.

On "Objections to Socialized Medicine", Part II

The second part of Mr. Day's "morality" argument deals with positive and negative rights. First, he gets the distinction wrong, and, second, he endorses negative rights over positive rights, even though he claims negative rights are a "perverted philosophy." The inconsistency yields his argument impotent.

He addresses positive and negative rights in response to the question: "does everyone have a right to health care?" Before I critique Mr. Day's argument, let me give a brief definition of a positive and a negative right. A positive right is one in which an agent (or a community of agents) has the ability to control his/her own destiny. The Constitution mentions a number of positive rights, e.g., freedom of the press, freedom of speech, etc. A negative right is one in which the agent is entitled to non-interference. For example, I have a right not to be assaulted as I walk down Washington Blvd. (For a terrific overview of "rights," see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry here.)

Mr. Day begins his argument with the following: "All through our history, rights were understood as actions or activities that the individual could not lawfully be prevented from doing." This is a negative right because a person cannot prevent me from going to the grocery store, from expressing an opinion, etc. Mr. Day thinks that positive rights, "freedom of speech," follow necessarily from an expression of the negative right. Positive rights don't necessarily follow from negative rights. On the contrary, negative rights can only tell us that we cannot prevent others from performing some action. Positive rights tell us that we can perform some action. So, I don't see how these are logically connected in the way that Mr. Day has argued.

His argument becomes more confused. He writes that negative rights "commit all others to provide something for them." I'm not sure how to cash this out. Negative rights do not guarantee that anybody will do anything for anybody else. Negative rights merely prevent people from impeding my ability to do what I want to do. So, negative rights shouldn't be characterized in the way Mr. Day has suggested.

My favorite part of his argument is the following:

I categorically reject these ridiculous negative rights and find no moral, legal or philosophical justification for them. Economic chaos would ensue if they were instituted. Yes, everyone has the positive right to acquire food, shelter, clothing, health care, etc. Thus, there are to be no barriers beyond the individual's own resources to restrict access.

At the beginning of the entry he rejects negative rights. He rejects negative rights because economic chaos would be the result. It doesn't follow that the economy would be adversely affected if negative rights were instated. Mr. Day's is missing a premise in his argument. I fail to see a reasonable premise to add. So, it's best to reject his argument. Moreover, his argument is inconsistent. The ultimate conclusion, i.e., following: "Thus, there are...", expresses a negative right, which is something he "categorically rejects."

I better say something positive about Mr. Day before I close because it's not good to leave a person looking like they've just given an inconsistent argument. Mr. Day's article raises an important issue about the the nature of universal health care coverage. What is it exactly? How do we go about funding it? Should everyone benefit from it? I'm not sure how to respond to these questions, but I imagine that universal health care coverage will provide everyone with the health care they need. Doctors, private insurers, government officials, and the general public will have to sit down and discuss the important issues that Mr. Day has attempted to raise in his brief commentary.

On "Objections to Socialized Medicine"

The Standard Examiner, Ogden's newspaper, published a guest commentary by J. Paul Day in today's newspaper on socialized medicine (available here). He argues that instituting socialized medicine is unjustified because the Constitution doesn't permit it, socialized medicine ought to be morally forbidden, and governmental oversight of health insurers doesn't make sense from an economic standpoint.

In my response, I don't want to argue for socialized medicine; my aim is merely to poke a few holes in one of Mr. Day's argument. My primary interest is in his argument that socialized medicine ought to be morally forbidden. Tomorrow, I'll post a follow-up that hopes to show Mr. Day has failed to understand the distinction between positive and negative rights, and his argument presumes something very specific about the nature of socialized medicine.

Mr. Day's argument is a basic one. Let me reconstruct it in a simple, easy-to-understand, form:

1) Under universal health care coverage, an individual receives the benefits of health insurance.

2) Universal coverage is a government-sponsored program.

3) Government-sponsored programs are subsidized by the taxpayers of the state (country, as the case may be).

4) So, universal coverage is subsidized by the taxpayers. (from 1-3)

5) In Mr. Day's words, "It is immoral for the state to take the product of one's labor [the taxpayers] and distribute it to someone who didn't earn it."

6) Therefore, universal coverage ought to be morally forbidden. (from 4-6)

(Perhaps someone might think that I'm being a little uncharitable because I've omitted some of Mr. Day's points. The points he raises are redundant. I'm merely portraying his overall "morality" argument.)

Clearly the premises worthy of further exploration are (1) and (5). In premise 1, Mr. Day makes an assumption about who will receive health care coverage. He presumes that only those not paying into the system will receive the health care benefits. His redundant comments make this clear, e.g., he writes "The money is coerced from people who earned it "by the sweat of their brows" and given to people who didn't." It's universal coverage for a reason. People who pay into the system, like Mr. Day, will receive the same benefits that anyone would receive. So, when he or I find ourselves in need of health care benefits, we will be able to reap the rewards of the same system.

The system cannot prevent people from milking the system. I grant that! Some anarchists, e.g., don't pay taxes to the government because they don't feel they should have to subsidize government programs for the general public and for the underprivileged. They don't pay income taxes. Presumably, when April 15 rolls around each year, they don't file. They feel that they don't have to pay taxes because the people who benefit from government programs don't deserve the money they've earned by their own hand. But, if everyone were to forgo their taxes because they felt that they owed the government and other people nothing, then the highways they use, the schools they send their children to, and the fine men and women in uniform that protects them from the "evil-doers" would go the way of the Dodo bird.

Similarly, some of the government programs sponsored by income taxes benefit the general public. For example, transportation infrastructure improvement programs are the result of government sponsored programs. Is Mr. Day suggesting that we rid not only universal health coverage but also transportation infrastructure improvement programs? To draw a line between government sponsored programs is arbitrary at best.

Premise 5 is more controversial than Premise 1. Mr. Day provides no support for it. The lack of support for premise 5 suggests that we reject it.

How would one go about supporting premise 5? To do so would be hard (if not impossible) to justify. The government doesn't "take the product of one's labor" and re-distribute it to anyone. We are citizens of the state. The state protects us from outside invasion and from ourselves. What money we do expend is little in comparison to what we are afforded by our protected rights. So, it's not immoral for us to contribute to our own safety, but it's immoral for us not to pay our fair share of the protection of our rights and our fellow citizen's rights.

J. Paul Day regularly contributes to local newspapers, such as The Deseret Morning News, mostly in the form of letters to the editor. See here and here and here for other letters he's written. Almost all of them have one central theme: no one except the patient or the patient's dependents is responsible for health care coverage. I couldn't agree more with Mr. Day's assertion, but I'm not so naive as to think that some people are less well off than we are and that they sometimes find themselves in a predicament they cannot afford to get out of. These people may not be looking for a handout, as Mr. Day implies in his commentary, but they may be searching for ways to afford the care they desperately need.

News Briefs

Brian Leiter and Philosop-L reports that Susan Hurley has died after battling cancer for several years. Her contributions to philosophy are numerous, but one of her books that I vividly remember reading is Consciousness in Action.

August 16, 2007 is the 30th anniversary of Elvis Presley's death. If you ever get to Memphis, head over to Graceland for a tour. If you have time, travel down U.S. Highway 78 to Tupelo, MS. In Tupelo, visit Elvis's birthplace. Be forewarned, however: nothing in the house is original except the window sills and where the house now stands is not where it had stood when Elvis was young. Another thing to know about Elvis's birthplace is that if you visit it three times, then you may - on your fourth tour - try on Elvis's famous leather jacket. (Or at least that's what somebody told me.)

The new Mac is working out very well. It's extremely easy to use! Scott recommended I search my computer for a program known as OmniOutliner. I found it soon after talking with Scott. OO is a no-frills outlining program. It's amazing! For an academic, an outliner program like this is integral for research. My one quibble with the Mac, actually Apple, is that they chose to release the new version of iLife one week after I purchased the Mac. The iLife '06 programs are awesome because they permit you to produce webpages, photos, etc. the way that you want. The programs don't limit you in the way that you structure your pages. I just have to figure out how to upload my webpages to the Weber server.

Dissertation writing is going very well too. I've been very productive the last three weeks, though I haven't been posting snippets to the blog. Most of what I'm doing now is revising the details of my argument. Also, I've discovered a few new problems relevant to what I discuss. So, I'm adding them to the dissertation where appropriate.

Concealed weapons on campus

Utah institutions of higher education permit students, faculty, and staff to carry concealed weapons on campus. Of course, they may carry them on campus only if they have a permit. (We have to have some limits!)

During a faculty retreat this weekend, several new faculty members who were from other parts of the country seemed to be very concerned about this law. In particular, they were very worried about the prospect of knowing that a student brought a concealed hand gun into their classroom. Many believed that if they knew the student were carrying a gun, they would be intimidated by it. So, what's an instructor to do if they know a student of theirs is carrying a concealed gun on campus?

When adminstrators were asked about the policy at our university, they dodged the question. We were told to see someone else - i.e., the university attorney. This is the correct thing to do under the circumstances because they may not know what the official university policy is.

But I want to brainstorm a bit about the practical issues that arise if an instructor knows that a student is carrying a concealed weapon and it is legal for him/her to do so. First, I'd remain calm - that's probably best for you, the student carrying the weapon, and the students in the class.

Next, I wouldn't approach the student about his/her carrying the weapon. That may invite a confrontation, which is something everyone wants to avoid.

Finally, I'd contact an administrator, like a department chair or dean, to tell them about the fact that a student was carrying a gun to class. This might be hiding behind management, but I don't think it's the faculty's responsibility to disarm or to talk with a student who is armed. Administrators are probably in a better position to know how to deal with the student.

There's a lot of problems that arise from my position. For instance, if the student were to hurt someone - whether a fellow student, faculty, or staff - after I had known he/she was carrying a weapon, then I might be at least partially accountable for not having tried to prevent the student from doing so.

Concealed weapons on campus

Utah institutions of higher education permit students, faculty, and staff to carry concealed weapons on campus. Of course, they may carry them on campus only if they have a permit. (We have to have some limits!)

During a faculty retreat this weekend, several new faculty members who were from other parts of the country seem to be very concerned about this law. In particular, they were very worried about the prospect of knowing that a student could bring a concealed hand gun into the classroom. Many believed that if they knew the student were carrying a gun, they would be intimidated by it. So, what's an instructor to do if they know a student of theirs is carrying a concealed gun on campus?

When adminstrators were asked about the policy at our university, they dodged the question. We were told to see someone else - i.e., the university attorney. This is the correct thing to do under the circumstances because they may not know what the official university policy is.

But I want to brainstorm a bit about the practical issues that arise if an instructor knows that a student is carrying a concealed weapon and it is legal for him/her to do so. First, I'd remain calm - that's probably best for you, the student carrying the weapon, and the students in the class.

Next, I wouldn't approach the student about his/her carrying the weapon. That may invite a confrontation, which is something everyone wants to avoid.

Habitat redescription

Much of my dissertation considers how the description (and re-description) of action influences people's moral deliberation about some action they want (or want not to) perform. Let me talk about the first part: action description and re-description and dismiss - at least for the moment - how action descriptions influence moral deliberation.

When an action is described in one way and then another way, the question is whether both descriptions refer to the same act or different ones. This has been called the problem of action individuation. The first chapter reviews why the problem of action individuation is important.

Few action theorists have been careful about constructing a strong motivational story for the problem, so I thought it would be a good way to open the dissertation. I provide the conventional motivation story, and follow that story with my own arguments.

My own motivational arguments come from other sources in philosophy, especially ones with practical implications, e.g., just war, active v. passive euthanasia, etc.

In discussing my dissertation with a colleague in zoology, I found that the issue may be much more ubiquitous than I had suspected. I was told that habitat redescription plays a large role in zoologists' (and biologists' for that matter) research. Depending on which way the zoologist or biologist goes about describing the habitat and whether other biologists or zoologists in the field think that the data refers to the same habitat or not seems to play a role in thinking their research is important. Someone who thinks that all habitats are different and - subsequently - that each habitat description refers to different habitats will probably think that others' research will not effect their own. On the other hand, if one thinks that one can have multiple descriptions of the same habitat, then that person may be inclined to accept that those descriptions apply to similar habitats.

I haven't worked out the details of the view, and I'm not well versed in the literature. But I think that this brief discussion I had seems to show that the problem of individuation is present in other disciplines. If it is, then this might be another motivation for continuing the project of action individuation.

Kinda bad news...

I'm trying to resolve problems with my blogger account now that I've switched to using a Mac. But It looks like I won't be able to use some of the features of blogger.

From the blogger help desk:

"Drag-and-drop customization of the new Blogger’s new template system (layouts) does not work in Safari, nor does fonts and colors customization. You must use either Firefox or Internet Explorer 6+ to use these features of the new Blogger. (They also work mostly with Opera 9, though with some visual glitches.)"

The question is whether I want to download Firefox or IE6+.

Philosopher's Carnival

Enigmania hosts the newest Philosopher's Carnival here: http://enigmanically.blogspot.com/2007/08/51st-philosophers-carnival.html.