Keepin' Hope Alive

I am fortunate to have some interviews at the APA-Eastern Division meeting next week and an on-campus interview scheduled in January. I wish everyone on the job market well!

Some other blogs have cited a new information sharing wiki website. The wiki site has information regarding those departments that have notified interviewees, those schools who have already set-up on-campus interviews, those schools that have already contacted candidates for on-campus interviews, etc. The site also lists schools they're "awaiting news concerning." (I imagine that we can interpret this as "schools who are still working on setting up interviews at the APA.") The site is available by clicking here.

I believe that the clearinghouse is - generally - a good service for those of us on the job market. It gives us a sense of which schools have been actively calling job candidates and which schools have not yet called prospective job candidates. But does the site provide reliable (good) information?

I believe the page has its problems. First, schools who have contacted interviewees may not have called all of the canidates they would like to interview at the APA. If the website indicates that some school has contacted interviewees, job candidates may think that they no longer stand a chance of getting an interview with that school. Perhaps this is true. But it might be that the school is still considering some candidates and has not yet called these candidates because they have not decided which candidates to call. (Then again, this might be me living a pipe dream.)

Second, wiki may be updated by anyone. Anyone could include people who are not in philosophy. Anyone could include "hackers." Someone may have listed a school inappropriately - as a joke. Since wiki may be updated by anyone, we may not want to take the lists too seriously.

Finally, the "meddling" note exemplifies the problems with the wiki site. Though I admire the person/entity who started the wiki site, we might want to consider changing venues. If the site were administered by a reputable person in the field and if that person had a way of confirming whether or not schools had contacted interviewees, etc., then I - for one - would be much more comfortable trusting the site.

(HT: Thoughts, Arguments, Rants; Leiter Reports)

Forthcoming Blogs

I'm starting a blog for my philosophy of western religion class. Its title: Blogio Ex Nihilo. The title might be lame. So if anyone has a suggestion for a schnazzy title, let me know. I'm sure I'd consider your suggestion!

Second, a friend has told me that he'll be starting his own blog soon. Its title: Gratiaetnatura. Check in with it every so often! I'll try to feature a link to it from here when he begins writing content to the page. Also, I should have a hyperlink to it from my blogroll shortly.

Also, I'm looking for contributors to the class blog. I plan to have guest bloggers. Guest bloggers are welcome to contribute a zafdig post once in the semester, and they are welcome to comment whenever they like. If you're interested, comment here or email me!

(I'm going to line up a few guest bloggers when I'm at the APA-Eastern in about a week or so.)

Personal identity, Persistence & Immortality

There are numerous arguments about the persistence of one's personal identity over time. The two most common arguments use either the body criterion or the psychological criterion.

For the first, you are the same person today as you were yesterday because you have virtually the same body today as you had yesterday. For the second, you are the same person today as you were yesterday because you carry your memories with you. (This is a bit inaccurate, but I'm merely trying to outline the positions broadly.)

When we discuss whether there is life after death, we want to say that all of the memories we have today will be with us in the afterlife. Similarly, we want to say that we will inhabit a spiritual body that is very similar to the one we inhabit in this life. (I imagine we say this because we'd like to think that members of our family and friends of ours will recognize us in the hereafter only if we inhabit a body much like our own.) So, it seems that questions of the persistence of our personal identity contribute to our understanding of immortality.

Though I'd like to think that questions of personal identity might enlighten us on questions of immoratlity, I have some reservations. First, what physical self does my spiritual self resemble? Say that I befriended a person when I was 10. It would do me and him no good in the afterlife if my spiritual body resembled my physical 40 year old body. He would not recognize me, even though I may recognize him. At least with respect to the bodily criterion, we have to worry what physical body our spiritual body resembles.

40th Philosophers' Carnival

The newest Philosophers' Carnival is posted at Thom Brooks blog.

Is resurrection a question of personal identity?

Resurrection, the belief that we are reunited with a body someday in the future, has been cast as a problem of personal identity. I gather that the biggest problem is the reunification of one's memories with the appropriate physical body.

The problem with reunification is that one's own physical body has probably disintegrated from the time of death to the resurrection. If the original body no longer exists, then my psychological self can't unify with the appropriate physical person. Moreover, should cannibals eat my body, it will be difficult to inviduate between my own body and their body. So, again, my psychologically constituted self would not unite with the appropriate physical body at resurrection.

Hick's solution, which I don't want to go into too much here, is that God will create an exact replica of me for my psychological self to inhabit. (I'm mincing words here; in other words, I'm skipping a lot of details.) The problem with Hick's theory is just that the replica is not my physical self; it's the replica of my physical self. So, I can't say that I inhabit the same body. Furthermore, if God can create replicas of me, then why not create more than one physical self I can inhabit.

What I seek is an alternative explanation of the physical self and personal identity over time with the notion of resurrection of the body. To my mind, neither the physical self nor the psychologically constituted self play a significant role in resurrecting me. My resurrected body is different than my physical body. My resurrected psychological self is different than my earthly psychological self. Since my resurrected self and body will be in a different time and in a different space than my current earthly self, none of the characteristics of my earthly self or body will carry over to the the resurrected self or body. So, I will be a completely different resurrected self with attributes or properties similar enough to my earthly self.

Five Favorite Philosophers

Prompted by a recent posting at Mormon Metaphysics, I've decided to list my favorite philosophers here and provide explanations for why they are my favorite. Bear in mind as you read that these are my personal favorites and these are my explanations for why they happen to be my personal favorites.

1) Alexius Meinong. Perhaps it was his awkward writing style or it was his outlandish metaphysical theory of objects (gegenstandstheorie) that enamored me the first time I read him. I found his theories so peculiar that I could not help but read everything I could about him.

Although his views were peculiar, his views were consistently peculiar. He "bit the philosophical bullet" in almost every defense of his theory of objects. I imagine that he was aware of the logical problems the theory of objects raised for objects like "squircles" or "golden mountains," but that didn't stop him from attempting to produce a logical system that captured these non-existent (subsistent) objects.

His philosophical views have impacted my philosophical views greatly, and I - at least partially - honor him by naming my blog after a line from his "Theory of Objects," "There exist objects that do not exist."

2) Ludwig Wittgenstein. What can I say but "it's Wittgenstein." There are more stories circulating about Wittgenstein's behavior toward other philosophers, scientists, and mathematicians than any other person I know of. The stories, probably some of them are urban legend, make him an interesting fellow indeed. When you come right down to it, though, he had a lot of interesting things to say. Much of what he's said come in the form of aphorisms. It takes a great deal of effort to manipulate these aphorisms into an argument, but it can be done.

I also enjoy his work because he's not afraid to mention and to discuss nonsense. Nonsense comes up more in his works than anybody else's work. Sometimes he uses the term to dismiss someone else's work. Other times he broods over it. Anyone in philosophy should read parts of either the Tractatus or the Philosophical Investigations. They are very enjoyable to read, but they are difficult to read.


3) Jan Lukasiewicz. He was the Polish logician who devised a three-valued logic. I find his writings innovative and creative. I take these two traits to be the hallmark of any good philosopher.

I guess I'm also partial to Lukasiewicz because we share a common heritage. His family is from the same part of Poland as my family is from.

Many of Lukasiewicz's works were formal, but I think many of them can be translated for other parts of philosophy. For instance, I think we could devise an ethical system using the same sorts of techniques Lukasiewicz used in logic.

4) G.E.M. Anscombe. She is underrated as a philosopher in her own right, but her contributions to philosophy far outweigh anybody else in the philosophy of action and practical reasoning to date.

I had never read Anscombe before starting the doctoral program at Utah. Boy, I was missing out! Her works, particularly "Modern Moral Philosophy" and her book Intention, are very rich pieces of philosophy. Her writing has the tendency to be obscure in spots. Nevertheless, the "why?" question she raises in Intention has serious implications for action theory. It has helped others explain what action is, and the work has helped work out an enormous literature on intentional action.

Moreover, she has been a noted translator and executor of Wittgenstein's works. Without her service, we might not have access to Wittgenstein's works.

Finally, only now is she being recognized for her defense of Catholic theological and social doctrine. We need only read her essays "On Transubstantiation" and on sexual ethics to realize she was a tremendous advocate of Catholic philosophical thought.

5) St. Anselm. I spent an entire Lent reading and re-reading Anselm's Proslogion. Each time I read it I became more and more convinced that the ontological argument for God's existence was the most powerful of all the arguments.

Whenever I have a free moment, I usually pick up the Proslogion and read through it.





HT: Mormon Metaphysics

Vader Session

The following short film is pretty funny. Warning: it contains some offensive language.

New release: The Blackwell Guide to Medical Ethics

Blackwell Publishing has a series of edited anthologies that are an excellent resource for students. The series is called the "Blackwell Philosophy Guides." Each of the books in the series features articles by outstanding scholars. The articles cover many of the issues and themes in that area of philosophy today.

The latest release is The Blackwell Guide to Medical Ethics, edited by Rosamond Rhodes (The Graduate School - CUNY), Leslie P. Francis (Utah), and Anita Silvers (San Francisco State University).

The anthology has some great essays that cover complex topics in medical ethics. For instance, see:

Ending Life: F.M. Kamm (Harvard University)

Medical Confidentiality: Kenneth Kipnis (University of Hawaii at Manoa)

Discrimination in Medical Practice: Justice and the Obligations of Health Care Providers to Disadvantaged Patients: Leslie P. Francis (University of Utah)

Justice and the Financing of Health Care: Stephen R. Latham (Quinnipiac University)

Judgment and Justice: Evaluating Health Care for Chronically Ill and Disabled Patients: Anita Silvers (San Francisco State University)

LOLOLOLOL??????

Anyone who reads this blog knows that I have no idea how to work techno-speak (if that's what it's called).

It's taken me nearly 3 weeks to figure out what "HT" means. I observed people using it, but I never understood it. Then, one day someone spelled it out, and it all made sense to me - "hat tip." I've not done enough "HT"-ing, and that's probably aggravated a lot of folks. (My apologies!) I owe many "HT"s to other bloggers. Please understand that I've not deliberately omitted "HT". I just never knew what it meant. (BTW, by not HT-ing, does that mean I've plagiarized some other blogs by not appropriately identifying them as the source of my post?)

One piece of techno-speak I find peculiar is the locution: "LOLOLOLOL!" I understand that it's used in a way to show that something's "very funny." But I'm not sure that's the right way to interpret it. Isn't it more literally translated as: laugh out loud out loud out loud, etc., etc.?

If this is the correct interpretation (and I'm not going to claim it is b/c of my ignorance), then one should be offended when someone uses this locution. By getting louder and louder in laughing, they're no longer just laughing; they're mocking you. Mocking is offensive. So, we should be offended when someone uses this locution.

Indecision and Religion

I've been meeting with some locals recently, and they've instructed me to seek out the one true religion. Until we met, I wasn't aware of the fact that the "one true" religion was hidden.

As I reflected upon what they said to me, I thought about an argument that someone might use to defend some form of religious exclusivism.

1. An agent's indecisiveness is a form of skepticism. (premise)
2. The one true religion denies any form of skepticism. (premise)
3. So, the one true religion includes only those agents who are decisive. (1,2)

What strikes me as the most questionable premise is (1). Why should we think that a person's indecisiveness reflects skepticism? S might be indecisive about p, but that presumes that S knows that p is a live option. S doesn't have to deny knowledge of p at all. So, if S is indecisive, it doesn't follow that S is skeptical.

Furthermore, does (3) follow? Logically, yes, it does follow. More substantially, there is something very funny about it. Religions probably want to include people who are skeptical because they may be more effective at persuading other people that their religion is the "one true" religion.

Whither Wittgenstein?

This weekend I had a discussion with a friend about blogging and philosophy (my friend's name will remain anonymous to protect her innocence). After some conversation about the role of blogs in philosophy, our attention turned toward the topics of some blogs.

There are some blogs that represent major philosophical topics. For instance, we discussed epistemology (Certain Doubts) and phil. mind blogs (Brains, Brain Pains), and I mentioned Prosblogion, a blog on philosophy of religion. Other blogs to note include the bioethics blogs, Bioethics.net and Women's Bioethics Blog, the philosophy of art blog, Experimental Philosophy blog, and The Garden of Forking Paths.

Other blogs are comprised of students or faculty at a particular school. The problem with these blogs is that it's hard to get a read on whether they are representative of the students and faculty at that particular university. If they're not, then it's unwise (as I found out in the past) to try to associate these blogs with particular schools.

Then, she remarked, "why isn't there a [group] blog on Wittgenstein?" I had not thought about this before she mentioned it. After having heard her say that, I thought that there were a lot of missing blogs. I'll review some below, but, for now, I'd like to pay attention to the question about a Wittgenstein blog.

There isn't any group blog on Wittgenstein. Using Google's Blog search, however, there are over 18,500 discussions of Wittgenstein floating around the blogosphere. Also, there are a few blogs that have Wittgensteinian titles, e.g., Duck Rabbit and The Fly Bottle. But not one blog - that I know of anyway - is dedicated to Wittgenstein's work.

So, I ask: Why isn't there a group blog on Wittgenstein?

1. Wittgensteinian scholars follow Wittgenstein; sometimes they follow him to a fault. They do not publish anything, and I guess they leave their philosophical material to their executors. So, if they don't publish in philosophical journals, why should it be any different for the internet? They probably prefer not having any material published about them or by them whatsoever.
2. Can we imagine what a blog dedicated to Wittgenstein might look like? Perhaps the blog page would be filled with aphorisms and pithy remarks. Comments, forget about it! Comments would be a place for Wittgensteinians to exchange harsh and possibly overtly offensive attacks against the person.
3. Finally, it's possible that a blog on Wittgenstein would have to subdivide into various species. One blog is for those who agree with early Wittgenstein and the other is for those who agree with later Wittgenstein. A third group, "the uniters not the dividers," would share their thoughts on the unity of Wittgenstein's work in the early and late period.

There is a missing link in the blogosphere. Perhaps we should start a blog on Wittgenstein!

Other blogs missing from the blogosophere (at least as far as I can tell): group blog on ancient philosophy, group blog on early modern philosophy, group blog on early analytic philosophy, blog on (just) paradoxes [I'd be really pleased about seeing this blog!], blog on intentionality, and blog on philosophical issues surrounding death.

2007 Intermountain West Student Philosophy Conference

The University of Utah Philosophy Department is pleased to announce a call for papers for the 4th Annual Intermountain West Student Philosophy Conference. The conference will be held in and around the department between March 27th and March 30th, 2007.

Keynote Speaker:

Thomas Pogge

(Columbia University)

Submission Deadline:

February 1, 2007

The conference invites papers on topics in all areas of philosophy. Papers should be no longer than 3,000 words and be suitable for blind review. Submissions should include the following information on a separate cover sheet:

1. Word count;
2. Presentation title;
3. Abstract of no more than 100 words;
4. Academic status (Graduate or Undergraduate student);
5. Institutional affiliation;
6. Mailing address;
7. Email address;
8. Telephone number; and
9. Areas of philosophical interest.

Submissions that fail to include all of the above information will be dismissed. No more than one submission per author will be considered. Authors should submit their paper as an email attachment in Word, Wordperfect, .pdf, or .dvi format to utahphilgrad@msn.com. Authors are also encouraged to paste a copy of their paper in the body of the email to ensure that we receive your submission.

For any other questions, contact the conference coordinator, David Jackson: djxn@mindspring.com.

Tu Quoque or not Tu Quoque

I found the following letter to the editor in today's Standard Examiner.

The Dec. 3 letter, "Church's building venture begs questions," strongly criticized the LDS Church's commercial development project in Salt Lake.

The writer stated: "A practicing Catholic, I would be even more critical and scrutinizing if our church hierarchy expended such exorbitant financial resources for commercial value rather than serving a religious purpose."

My question to this writer is: How do you feel about the millions and millions of dollars now being paid to child sex abuse victims from offenses which occurred within your church?

Are you critical of this exorbitant expense? And does it serve a religious purpose? Sadly, the victims have been permanently damaged and deserve any compensation they receive...

Also, it takes money to earn money.

On top of the fallacious reasoning this writer uses, it's a seriously low blow.

If I were living in the 1920's, my name would be...

Your 1920's Name is:

Odie Arch

What's Your 1920's Name?

It's hard to imagine...

what Jim Morrison would have been like at the age of 63. Had he not died in 1971, he would have been 63 today.

There are a few clips of a young Morrison circulating around the internet. Apparently, he was in an insurance a Florida state college admissions commercial in 1962 (age: 19). In the commercial, Morrison is denied admission to Florida State University. Later he meets with an admissions counselor to discuss why he had been denied admission. The counselor cites a shortage of professors as one of the reasons.

If I understand the websites correctly, he completed the commercial when he was attending Florida State University's film program.

Also, there is an interesting account of his friendship/relationship with Mary Werbelow that appeared in the St. Petersburg Times in 2005 (available by clicking here). According to the account, Morrison and Werbelow were involved with one another for quite a long time. They remained friends after breaking up in 1965, just before The Doors formed.

I have to credit the music of the Doors with fostering my interest in philosophy. Their music prompted me to read Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Kerouac, and numerous poets (Blake, Donne, etc.).

DDE and Action Individuation, Take 2

Yesterday I discussed how DDE might motivate the problem of action individuation. I stand by that argument, but I think it's in need of some clarification. Let me provide a few examples for the sake of clarity.

Suppose that Edna will certainly die due to the head injuries she sustained in a car accident. Dr. Smith could remove Edna's heart, liver, and lungs to give three others lifesaving transplants. Since Dr. Smith foresees Edna's death and since his intention is to save the others' lives, Dr. Smith's transplanting Edna's organs is a single act from which a good consequence (saving the lives of the others) and a bad consequence (hastening Edna's death) follows.

This interpretation establishes that we ought not hold Dr. Smith morally accountable for Edna's death. Dr. Smith may transplant Edna's heart, liver, and lungs to save the lives of the other three. Dr. Smith foresees Edna's death, but her death is an unintended consequence of performing the transplant. His intention is to save the others' lives. So, Dr. Smith performs an act having both a good and a bad effect since the latter is merely foreseen but unintended.

That's one interpretation. But I don't think it's the whole story. Transplanting Edna's organs and hastening her death is a means to saving the lives of the three others. Acts are the objects of moral assessment. The The means is itself an act. If the means is itself an act and if that means can be understood as separate from the intended act (i.e., Dr. Smith's saving the lives of the other three), then DDE doesn't apply. Therefore, we ought to hold Dr. Smith morally accountable for his actions.

There are two interpretations of the case I've given. If we align ourselves with Davidson's account of act individuation (i.e., there are multiple interpretations that refer to the same action), then Dr. Smith is free and clear of moral responsibility. However, if we align ourselves with Goldman's account of act individuation (i.e., for each and every act description desginates a distinct act), then Dr. Smith ought to be held morally accountable for "hastening Edna's death." Getting clear about action individuation will help us out of this conundrum.

DDE and Action Individuation

I continue to struggle with a satisfactory motivational story for the problem of action individuation.

In a recent conversation, someone suggested that the problem of action individuation crops up in cases having to do with the doctrine of double effect. Therefore, if this is so, then we have what looks like a reasonable motivation for taking up the debate on action individuation, i.e., how many actions does an agent perform?

(I've mentioned other motivations in previous posts. Some might not be convinced by them. So, I hope that this problem sheds some light on motivations for taking up action individuation.)

First, let me give a general definition of the doctrine of double effect ("DDE"). DDE seeks to explain under what circumstances one may act when that action has both good and bad consequences. We often encounter examples in times of war. For instance, we may ask: should the U.S. target bomb Iraqi insurgent compounds even if some Iraqi citizens may die? The U.S. intends to hit the insurgent compound, not the Iraqi citizens. So, the Iraqis' deaths are merely foreseen but not intended. In times of war, it is expected that one side will target the opposition's compounds. So, the U.S.'s targeting the compound is either morally neutral or morally good. The U.S. could forecast a number of Iraqi citizen casualties, but the purpose of the mission is not to kill innocent Iraqis. Finally, by taking out the insurgency's compound, the U.S. may secure a safer future for Iraqis, may thwart future attacks by insurgency forces, and may possibly ensure a speedy end to the war.

This suggests four conditions on the action: the act must be morally good or morally neutral, the good effect must be the intended result of the act, the bad effect must be foreseen but not the intended result of the act, and the good effect outweighs the evil effect of the intended action.

But how does DDE relate to the problem of action individuation? Solving the problem of action individuation involves determining whether two or more action descriptions designate the same action or distinct actions. DDE prohibits actions where the bad effect is a means to the good. In other words, one cannot intend to kill the Iraqi civilians to win the war. Their deaths can be foreseen but not intended.

On Goldman's maximizing view: If the action descriptions designate distinct actions, then the U.S.'s 'killing the Iraqis' and 'targeting the insurgency compound' designate distinct actions. If that's so, then we hold the U.S. morally accountable for killing Iraqi civilians. The bad effect was brought about by the U.S., period. Not only was it foreseen by the U.S. but it must have been intended too.

On Davidson/Anscombe's minimizing view: If the action descriptions identify the same action, then the U.S.'s 'killing the Iraqis' and 'targeting the insurgency compound' designate one and the same action. The U.S. may not have intended to kill the civilians; yet, since they did kill Iraqi civilians and 'killing Iraqi civilians' identifies the same action as 'targeting the insurgency compound', we should hold the U.S. morally accountable. The bad effect and the good effect are identified by the same action description.

Consequently, a more perspicuous account of action individuation may lend a hand in the debate on the DDE.

News from On High...

about graduate programs in Chinese Philosophy. Leiter reports the state of Chinese philosophy in the post here.

Some of Leiter's comments strike close to home. He mentions the Utah graduate program. Notably:

Utah... [has] excellent young faculty but until they have established their reputations more widely, students who go there for Ph.D. study will need to cultivate serious external working relationships with bigger names in the field to ensure good job prospects.

I'll leave it to the reader to... well, I'll just leave it to you.

Cancel my subscription to the Resurrection

OK, well, maybe not. But I'm interested in what texts people suggest for an intense overview of scholarly works on the resurrection of Christ and works on the resurrection of human bodies (if that's the appropriate way to characterize it).

Moreover, I'm interested in works on immortality, and the evidential value of near-death experiences for immortality.

I've already skimmed the following sources:

• Caroline Bynum's The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200-1336
• Frank Tipler's The Physics of Immortality

A Problem with Ginet's Criterion for Action Individuation

Ginet's criterion for action individuation establishes that actions are layered structures. Given that two action descriptions, say X and Y, are co-agential, that is, the agents they refer to are the same, and are co-temporal, that is, the times they refer to overlap in such a way that the action designated by each description occurred during the same period of time, X and Y designate the same action if and only if:

1. X is semantically equivalent to Y;
2. X consists in Y; and
3. for every canonical action-designator Z, Z generates X if and only if Z generates Y.

Each of the above conditions must be present for two action descriptions to designate the same action. In this post, I'll ignore problems with (1) and (3) so that I can focus on (2).

Ginet defines the "consists in" relation this way: "Suarez's dialing the phone call at t" consisted in "Suarez's turning the rotary dial at t" if and only if Suarez's dialing the phone at t consisted in Suarez's turning the rotary dial. So, the by-relation holds for the consists in relation. If X consisted in Y, then X by Y. So, if Suarez's dialing 555-2239 consisted in Suarez's first turning the dial from 5 and then turning the dial from 5, and so on, then just because of that, Suarez dialed 555-2239 by first turning the dial from 5 and then turning the dial from 5, and so on.

On Ginet's account, we should say that an aggregate action has a plurality of parts that are themselves actions. But we perform some actions where the whole has more than one non-overlapping action performed by one agent. Suppose that Moreshead plays golf on Tuesday afternoon, and he attends the P.G.A. Teaching Seminar two months later. Moreshead's playing golf and attending the seminar are two distinct acts. Moreshead's playing golf is neither intended as a means to or a condition for his going to the seminar. So, there's no reason to say that Moreshead's attending the seminar consisted in his playing golf. (I'm also reminded here of Wimpy's false promise, "I'll pay you Tuesday for a hamburger today; but, alas, I'm not sure how that fits.)

Ginet might argue that since the two acts are temporally disassociated, his account of concrete action and the criterion of action individuation do not share this feature. Thus, if aggregate action is a typical sort of concrete action, then it cannot be temporally disassociated.

Let me modify the example a bit to quash Ginet's rebuttal. Suppose that while Moreshead's golfing his wife phones him and indicates that she's going into labor, so he dashes off the golf courase to the hospital. Moreshead's dashing off the course and his playing golf are temporally connected in a way that his playing golf and attending the teaching seminar are not. Thus, on Ginet's account, Moreshead's playing golf and his dashing off to the hospital are aggregate actions.

We do not want to say that the two actions constitute parts of a larger action because dashing off the golf course is not a part of the game. If it were, people would be fleeing from the course all the time. Accounts of the criterion for action individuation must specify the conditions under which various actions of an agent constitute parts of a larger action. Ginet's account doesn't do this adequately. So, we must reject his account.

More on the Mormonism/Christianity Debate

I mentioned some of the posts at Dangerous Ideas and Mormon Metaphysics, but I've recently come upon an extension of this debate that Vic and Clark may not have reviewed. The post is available here.

The issue is going to creep into popular media as 2008 draws closer. The fact that Mitt Romney is a Mormon will be a factor in his Presidential bid, if he indeed decides to run. (PoliBlog's got something stirring already here.)

Around the Horn

There have been some interesting discussions in the blogosphere, and I want to take this opportunity to share them with readers.

There's been some activity in discussions about the LDS Church, i.e., Mormonism. Clark, at Mormon Metaphysics, discusses evidence for the Book of Mormon. His discussion is linked, somewhat directly, to the discussion on Dangerous Ideas, on critiquing Mormonism. Victor also has discussions of Mormon Epistemology, DNA, and Falsification, Why Christians argue against Mormonism, Bill Craig and Mormon Epistemology, Craig's Response to the Mormon Objection, Steve Cannon's Essay on Mormonism, and Mormonism and the Falsification Challenge.

Of all the discussions in this series, I found most interesting the question: what kind of archaelogical or historical evidence would it take to falsify the Book of Mormon? From what I've read in the discussion, I find most of it circulating around the idea of "falsification." In other words, what would be needed to falsify Mormon beliefs? But I think this question presupposes an adequate answer to the evidential basis of religion generally. If we don't have an adequate answer to the latter, then our answer to the former is moot.

It appears to me that Clark comes closest to arguing for the evidential foundation when he writes (hopefully, Clark doesn't mind me quoting his entry liberally):

First off I don't think that somehow one experience invalidates facts. Rather (as I seem doomed to repeat unheard) I think facts only achieve their meaning through a hermeneutic process. That is I don't believe in absolute facts in the context of human inquiry. This means that any fact is itself open to hermeneutic
question and the evidences out of which we draw the fact can bring a different fact as contexts change. (i.e. as we know more)

If I understand Clark's evidential argument correctly, then it's something like the following: There is a fact of the matter. We do not have access to facts simpliciter, but we can interpret our experiences to the best of our ability. So, our interpretations come closest to facts of the matter. There are facts about religious beliefs and religious traditions. Thus, our interpretations of these beliefs and traditions come closest to the facts of the matter about religious beliefs and traditions.

Needless to say, the discussion is interesting, and I encourage anyone to read about it.

Second, there's an entry at I know what I know on the question "What is a teaching university?" I've posted a comment about the distinction between research and teaching universities, and I encourage others to do so too. Perhaps, if I have time, I'll post my own thoughts on this matter here.

Toodles!

Does "collection" entail "discovery?"

According to one Ogden, Utah resident it does. In today's Standard Examiner, a concerned citizen (who will remain nameless to protect him from further ridicule) attempts to set the record straight. He begins:

The Associated Press is not known to report a lot of things accurately.

Ugh... What's the problem here? Well, let's start with the obvious. First, the Associated Press ("AP") reports a lot of things. That's its job. To deny that the AP reports a lot of things is to deny the existence of the AP. I don't think that's what the writer is trying to do - though, as a philosopher, I'd be interested in hearing his argument for the claim. I think the writer meant, "The AP is known to report inaccurately a lot of things," or, if you fancy, "The AP is inaccurate in its reporting." Either way, what the writer says above is syntactically un-well structured (ugh...).

The writer continues (and this is where it really gets interesting):

Arthur Max reported that Anne Frank's diary pages, scattered in the concealed apartment where the family hid, were pieced together by her father. (my emphasis)

Let's imagine for a moment that the writer has accurately reported what Arthur Max said. (admission by oohlah: since I've not read Max's piece, I'm not sure the letter writer's reporting exactly what Max said.) So, Anne Frank's father pieced together Anne Frank's diary. When I say that I'm "piecing together" some research (or I say something like that), I don't mean by that that I've discovered it. It just means that the research I've compiled now needs some sorting out. There's no implication of discovery, though I may have discovered pieces of the research myself or (if I'm lucky) others have suggested that I go check out resources 1, 2, and 3 because they are important for my research.

The letter writer suggests that piecing together is discovering something. He writes:

Mr. Frank did not know of the diary. Miep Gies, Mr. Frank's secretary, found the pages after the Franks and all the others had been arrested, and she kept them until after the war. When Miep found out that Anne had died, she then turned the diary pages over to Mr. Frank.

I don't see how this denies what Max had said. If "piecing something together" entails something about "discovery," then the two ought to be closely related. But they shouldn't be understood as synonyms. There is a real distinction between piecing something together and discovering something.