Is it possible to individuate zombies from non-zombies?

For the purpose of this post, I define zombies as fully functional humanoid creatures who lack subjective phenomenological states, including thoughts, feelings, or what someone might call an "interior life," but who respond to external stimuli as anyone would expect of someone who had these internal goings-on.

We are able to distinguish the living from the dead because the living exhibit behavior consistent with what we would expect from someone who is living. For example, in walking down the hallway, I gesture toward Bob and say, "hello Bob!" Bob acknowledges my gesture and my greeting with his own, e.g., he waves and says, "hello Joe!" The living are able to "acknowledge" and they are able to "greet." They can reason about problems, experiential or otherwise. But we should expect the same from a zombie. They will exhibit behaviors consistent with "acknowledging" and with "greeting." They too can reason about problems, experiential or otherwise. If they engage in these sorts of behavior, then we cannot distinguish zombies from non-zombies. The behaviors of a zombie are consistent the behaviors of a human. So, there does not seem to be a way of distinguishing zombies from non-zombies.

Perhaps one might argue that the definition of zombie, as I presented it earlier, begs the question about zombie individuation. This could be true, but I gather that individuating zombies will have to point out something about "being internally dead, though they appear to be alive." How do we determine whether something's going on inside the head? Well, we really can't (even with such things as fMRI scans). This account fails.

One might try to individuate zombies from non-zombies using the appearance of being alive. The appearance of being alive is not to actually be alive. There's something about actually living creatures distinguishing them from zombies. The criterion might be that they have fully functional internal organs. Fully functional internal organs suggest that they have some sort of internal goings-on. Thus, zombies and non-zombies are distinct.

Since zombies exhibit the same sorts of behaviors as humans and a feature of humans is that they have fully functional internal organs, it seems that this criterion fails too. The zombie's innards should be revealed to be the same as the humans.

We are left to wonder what criterion will suffice to individuate zombies from non-zombies.

On next semester and an additional component to a class

As some of you know, I'm scheduled to teach an upper-division philosophy of western religion class in the spring. Several bloggers over at Prosblogion aided me in developing the class. Their advice was invaluable.

The course will introduce students to philosophy of western religion through an exploration of three major controversies in the area: arguments for God's existence, the problem of evil, and immortality. The class requires a bit of stage-setting. We will begin with a brief overview on the nature of religion and the attributes of a Judeo-Christian God, i.e., omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, and omnipresence. Then, we will canvas the literature on the arguments for the existence of God. Following that, we'll use either William Rowe's or John Hick's summary of the problem of evil to begin a discussion of it. The final portion of the course will survey the notion of immortality. The discussion of immortality will include near-death experience, resurrection, and "the very idea of timelessness."

The course will try to incorporate blogging into the regular activities of the class. First, one member of the class or a guest blogger will blog on an item in the class - either an article or an argument the person finds particularly interesting. Then, members of the class and the public will be able to engage in a discussion with the student or the guest blogger on his/her blog entry. If anyone's interested in becoming a guest blogger, let me know.

(The pedagogical technique is not terribly new to me. The concept of "blurbing" was introduced to me by Bob Barnard. "Blurbing" and blogging are very similar, but blurbs aren't publicly available. Blurbs are housed on a secure internet site.)

You gonna bark all day little doggie, or are you gonna bite?

I went out and rented Reservoir Dogs again; it's probably the 100th or so time I've watched it. The movie was popular when I was an undergraduate, so people rented it, bought it, and watched it regularly. What strikes me now more than ever is that the movie is not about a crime gone terribly wrong but about justice.

But I don't want to necessarily talk about justice and its relationship to Reservoir Dogs; rather, I'd like to talk about Mr. Blonde and his looking out for the least well-off.

Lets think about Mr. Blonde, the menacing psychopath who takes out a 21 year-old girl because "she tripped the alarm." She shouldn't have touched the alarm, he tells us. There's an insane interpretation of Mr. Blonde's actions that tell us he was looking out for the least well-off. He's protecting himself and his partners who I imagine are the least well-off in this case because they don't see the woman who's about to trip the alarm. If Blonde had not killed her, then they might've all been killed. In that case, his killing the girl was necessary to protect himself and his partners.

Do you know when you're going to die?

There's an old Steven Wright joke that goes something like this: "I know when I'm going to die because my birth certificate has an expiration date on it." We now have a way of determining our projected death date thanks to the internet.

If you're interested in finding out about when you will die, check out deathclock.com. The website asks you a few questions about your smoking habits, your BMI, and your date of birth to determine when you will die.

I will die on Tuesday July 27, 2066. As of this writing, I have 1,885,362,601 seconds remaining in life. Tick-tock... tick-tock... tick-tock...

The Dissertation Clearinghouse

Josh Dever, at UT-Austin, has posted a webpage that collects the names and hyperlinks to doctoral dissertations in philosophy posted online. Check it out by clicking here.

Doctoral dissertations are more a rite of passage than something many people cite, as he notes on the webpage. Graduate students are well advised to bear that in mind when they attempt to complete one.

Motivating a project on action individuation is hard work

A few months ago there was an exchange on the The Garden of Forking Paths blog on whether we should care about action individuation. The exchange must have happened during one of my black-outs. I did not have a chance to contribute to the discussion.

Let me ask it again here. Should we care about action individuation? Heck yeah, we should. If you wanna know why, read on.

First things first. The conventional motivation story for taking up action individuation is inadequate. The driving force behind most theories of action individuation has been Davidson's conception for taking up the problem. I take it that he's attempting to show how Quine's program in ontology applies to actions. Underlying his account is an understanding of cause and effect that some would have reason to deny because there are other accounts of causation, besides the one that Davidson adopted. It's reasonable to presume that Davidson's motivation for taking up action individuation no longer applies. (Lets presume that this for the moment, though I don't think it necessarily has to be the case for me to argue over motivation for the problem of action individuation.)

1. The problem of relevant descriptions in Kantian ethics. In Kantian ethics, universality tests are designed to check whether maxims pass the different formulations of the categorical imperative. But a problem for the universality tests is that maxims are realizeable in many different forms. This is so because there are infinitely many action descriptions that designate an action. The Kantian is left with the question: which maxim is morally relevant?

Exploring the problem of action individuation is meant to solve the riddle: how many separate actions did an agent perform? A solution to this problem seems likely to help us answer the problem of relevant descriptions. Distinguishing whether one or more action description designates a single act or multiple acts clarifies what action the agent performed. Clarification of an action reveals certain contextual elements of an action that may or may not be morally relevant. So, individuating actions may move us a step closer to solving the problem of relevant descriptions. (I'm careful here not to say, unequivocally, that such will be the case, but all I'm after is motivation for investigating action individuation. I think this argument provides exactly that.)

2. Living virtuously. Some have thought the best way for one to become virtuous is to do what virtuous people do. If they replicate the virtuous person's actions, then they too become virtuous. Like in Kantian ethics, though, there is the problem of what exactly is it that virtuous people do. Couldn't we describe the virtuous person's actions in many different ways? If this is so, then how do we know whether the person is simulating what a virtuous person would do? An investigation of action individuation may be able to parse out whether the action description that the one who wants to be virtuous coincides with a description of the virtuous person's actions.

I don't have time now to further motivate the problem of action individuation, but I think there are other motivations, e.g.:

3. Planning and Practical Reason
4. Philosophy of Law
5. International Affairs
6. Philosophy of History
7. Personal Identity

Why do social conservatives badger academicians?

Social conservative pundits criticize academicians for promoting alternative lifestyles. By alternative lifestyles, I mean we academicians endorse heterosexual co-habitation and same-sex marriage. I received an email recently emphasizing this fact.

The author of the email cites Dr. Allan Carlson, author of Conjugal America: On the Public Purposes of Marriage, who writes, "Since the 1960’s, our institutions have combined to denigrate marriage and the family. Hollywood offered a jaundiced view of marriage and family life, celebrated extra-marital sex and made self-fulfillment – not duty – the highest goal. Our educational institutions, the news media and the bureaucracy reinforced this perspective.”

But I don't understand how we reinforce the view that marriage is a bad thing. If academicians do endorse anything, then it is to promote equality among people, regardless of age, race, gender, religious affiliation, or sexual orientation. If we promote equal rights, then we must promote one's right to marry. So, we don't restrict or offer a "jaundiced view of marriage."

Social conservatives prefer to discriminate against other people because of their race, gender, age, religious affiliation, or sexual orientation. Prejudice cateorizes people by their physical or mental qualities. Marriage is blind to these qualities. Thus, it is the social conservatives who actually provide a "jaundiced" view of marriage.

Here's a stupid little argument that might lead to a challenge of the Bush Doctrine

I thought of the following argument in class a few weeks ago; at the time, I didn't think it mattered much. Since I've not heard it raised by others, I write it here for public consumption.

The argument struck me all of a sudden while teaching an intro to philosophy class. I haven't put any time into thinking about it. So, the argument - like all of the other arguments I create on my blog - is underdeveloped. I think it's a stupid little argument, but it might be worthy of consideration.

First, the argument addresses the Bush doctrine as it was first set out in his West Point commencement speech in 2002. The doctrine has been revised, and it is a part of the National Security Strategy of 2002. Since I've not had a chance to carefully review the National Security Strategy, please understand that my argument is meant to challenge the original Bush doctrine, not the revised one. (Though, if what I've heard about the revised doctrine is true, then it's likely to work against it too.)

Second, two facts about the Bush doctrine must be kept in mind. The Bush doctrine begins with the fact that there is no distinction between terrorists and those who harbor them. Entities that are found to harbor terrorists are as guilty as the terrorists themselves who carry out their horrific actions. Each of these beliefs lead to a justification of pre-emptive strikes against terrorists themselves and those who harbor them.

(1) There is no distinction between terrorists and those that harbor terrorists. (premise; element of Bush doctrine)

(2) The internet permit terrorists to communicate and to purchase weapons from other cells or from other countries, etc. (premise)

(3) So, the internet harbors terrorist cells. (1,2)

(4) Anything that harbors terrorists and presents a clear and present danger to the United States ought to be destroyed to prevent potential aggressors from attacking soft targets. (premise; the pre-emptive strike policy)

(5) Therefore, the internet ought to be destroyed. (3,4)

WTF? This can't be right; can it?

Meinong's Hume Studien available online and in English

If you're interested in reading Meinong's Hume Studien, it is now available in English and it is available online. Head over to Steve Bayne's hist-analytic.org website. By clicking here, you'll be able to access Meinong's book.

Steve's also posted a paper entitled "Russellian Annahmen." It's available by clicking here. If I'm a bit ambitious in the next few weeks and if my dissertation progresses well, I'll be able write a brief commentary on it.

My interest in Meinong was rejuvenated earlier in the semester when I had the opportunity to present on Meinong's concept of ausserseined. I'd like to pursue more studies in the philosophy of Meinong after finishing my PhD.

Dissertation blues, the job hunt, and the iMac

I've been writing, reviewing, and revising my dissertation for the past two months and teaching at Weber State, so I have stopped blogging. (I know my many fans are disappointed. Yeah, right! As if I had fans. As if I had readers.) I would like to blog everyday, but I'd prefer to graduate sooner rather than later. So, blogging may be sporadic over the next few weeks (months).

Blogging helped me in writing drafts of my chapters. So, I'm going to post a few things this coming week on action individuation.

Preview: There's one thing I'd like to work out in particular. I call it the agnostic view of action individuation (it probably shouldn't be called that, but I haven't yet worked out a better name for it; once I do, I'll replace "agnostic" with it). The primary author of the view is Mele. Mele has referred to action individuation in many of his recent writings (1992, 1997, 2002, 2003, ms). But he has been stand-offish about whether he endorses any one of the other three positions in the literature. The stand-offishness is a position itself.

Second, I've been working through job applications. Two things struck me about the ads. Several of the ads in JFP have broad AOS and AOC requirements. Schools are looking for people with a great deal of breadth in their teaching and research interests. Also, it's a good year to have an AOS in ethics, including moral theory (which I suppose includes metaethics and normative ethics) and applied ethics (e.g., professional or business ethics).

Finally, I've been thinking about purchasing an iMac. Apple has made many improvements to the systems it offers, and the addition of Virtual Windows may ease the transition from PC-to-Mac. But I'm primarily interested in the graphics. Apple has always out-done PCs with respect to graphics capability, and the new iMac system is no exception to this rule. At this time, I've not made a final decision, but I'd like to hear from people who may have made the transition recently or who want to praise or condemn the new iMac system.