Nielsen and BYU update

The Salt Lake Tribune published a feature article on Professor Nielsen here, and several bloggers have supported or criticized BYU's actions, which seems to be limited to the Philosophy Department (given what the article says).

Here are a few fellow bloggers on the matter:

The Entre Blog, and here again;

Dave's Mormon Inquiry;

Messenger and Advocate;

Trevor Dodge;

Free Speech 101;

Obiter Dicta by Steve;

Blogging with a Hammer; and

Shots in the Dark.

There are many more blogs weighing in on the Nielsen controversy. Most of the arguments favoring the dismissal of Nielsen cite his choosing to contradict the Church's teaching in a public forum, the Salt Lake Tribune, as the reason for firing the instructor. Most of the arguments supporting Nielsen's statement against Church policy cite academic freedom as the reason for permitting him to make such criticisms publicly.

Here are two other arguments to consider. BYU is a private institution of higher education funded by the LDS Church. Private businesses may dismiss or fire employees, particularly employees-at-will, without citing any reason. So, BYU can dismiss employees for whatever reason they see fit.

BYU's Philosophy department chair says that Nielsen was fired because he chose "to contradict and oppose the church in an area of great concern to church leaders, and to do so in a public forum." Sometimes contradicting and opposing the majority opinion in important matters is the morally responsible action. For example, any act of civil disobedience, such as that of Ghandi or MLK, Jr., could be considered such a morally responsible act. BYU fired Nielsen for doing the morally responsible action. Firing a person for doing the right thing is unfair. So, BYU has unfairly fired Nielsen.

Brentano and the History of Experimental Philosophy

Thanks to a link provided by Siris (For some reason, I've omitted him from my blogroll. Tremendous apologies to Brandon!), a post at Mixing Memory prompted me to think about Brentano again (actually, I omit Mixing Memory from my blogroll too. Ugh! Sorry about that Chris). For those who do not know me very well, I wrote a master's thesis entitled Intentionality and Ontology, which was heavily influenced by my reading of Brentano, Frege, Meinong, Mally, Marty, and Russell.

First, I want to make a brief editorial comment about Chris's (Mixing Memory) Brentano post. Then, I want to discuss some candidates of experimental philosophy.

Chris raises a point about Brentano's conception of intentionality. He writes that Brentano "gave us the concept of "intentionality" that is still used, in one form or another, in both psychology and philosophy of mind." First, there are many (probably a majority) philosophers who would deny Chris's claim outright. Brentano's form of intentionality is and has been dead for 100 years. They may have inherited the topic but not its content. I believe that they would argue Brentano's conception of intentionality included too many oddities for it to be a salvageable concept of "intentionality." Thus, Brentano's conception of "intentionality" is not still in use in any form whatsoever.

Second, Brentano's conception of intentionality, or "intentional inexistence" as he had referred to it in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and later works, was never completely formulated. Brentano waivered back-and-forth throughout most of his career between different conceptions of "intentionality." Anyone who's read the appendices in The True and The Evident will recognize Brentano's constant struggle to develop an account of intentionality. So, here's yet another reason to think that we fail to use Brentano's conception of "intentionality" nowadays.

(I'd be willing to argue that it was Husserl's conception of "intentionality" that philosophers of mind still use today. Remember Husserl's famous quotation is "consciousness is consciousness of." His concept was far more stable than Brentano's, and it had a lot more uptake - which doesn't make it the correct view. One thing deserves consideration though: Husserl was a student of Brentano's.)

Chris did not deny the existence of such a controversy. But I just want to raise the controversy because it deserves some consideration when we think about Brentano and his influence on Freud or on early analytic philosophy.

Chris's post is very interesting. He writes something about Brentano that I think can be attributed to the recent surge of interest in experimental philosophy. He writes that Brentano's belief was that the "descriptive approach would lead to the discovery of universal psychological laws, and thus that it was the only genuinely scientific approach to psychology." If the belief is correct and we can translate it into philosophy, then that might suggest a scientific approach to philosophy. I don't want to tackle that topic here. I'd like to briefly consider predecessors of the current trend of experimental philosophy.

The Experimental philosophy blog reported that the Norweigans may have been the first experimental philosophers, but I have evidence that shows a type of experimental philosophy was used at the beginning of the century by Edwin Tausch, a philosopher, at Ohio University. In October 1905, Tausch published a Note in Mind asking for volunteers to send him some of their thoughts on the meaning of life. Tausch later published the results (in theoretic form) in the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods - the predecessor of the Journal of Philosophy.

Experimental philosophy's beginnings may have a much richer history than we had ever expected.

What's so philosophical about experimental philosophy? (1st Attempt)

(This is a first attempt at answering Matt Mullins question, "what's so philosophical about experimental philosophy?" It'll probably not suffice, but I'll work on it. I have had a draft of this post for the past few weeks, and I've worked on it off and on for a while. It is a small part of a chapter in my dissertation. Comments are welcome and appreciated. Much of the demarcation discussion was prompted by a fellow Utah graduate student's comments. S/he will remain anonymous for the time being.)

Much work has been accomplished by experimental philosophy. But it remains an open question just what kind of work it has done for the discipline. Mostly it's negative work because it shows how conceptual analysis has failed to tap into peoples' intuitions. A growing number of experimental philosophers have become dissatisfied with this approach. They seek a more positive role for experimental research. On this view, they want to show us what peoples' intuitions are. Though I cannot discuss the details of each view in this post, I want to outline some reasons for thinking that experimental philosophy is important for the discipline.

Experimental philosophy uses a different method to reach its conclusions. The method employs a type of assessment meant to elicit intuitive responses from ordinary people. People who are not philosophers are the subjects of the assessments. The assessments consist in a few questions the subjects are invited to answer. The answers the majority choose, if statistically significant, are reported by the researcher.

The more popular method used by philosophy is conceptual analysis. It depends on a philosopher's own intuitions to accurately reflect the intuitions of ordinary people. If experimental philosophy is correct, then the method philosophers have used for thousands of years may be undermined by experimental work. A few questions remain for experimental philosophy to answer. Is it philosophy? Is it science? Is it psychology? I will now try to show why arguing experimental philosophy is not philosophy fails.

Demarcating science from non-science has proven to be out of reach. For instance, the discussion of science versus non-science virtually ended when it was discovered that one could not easily distinguish between a scientific endeavor and a non-scientific one, like astrology. Many disciplines we think are not science have characteristics we associate with science. Some astrologers, for instance, use the positions of the moon, stars, and planets, to show how they affect peoples' moods, lifestyles, etc. I am not arguing that astrology is good science (and I definitely would not argue that), but some types of astrology do have characteristics consistent with science. Even some intelligent design arguments contain elements of scientific research. Both sides of that debate will deny it, but I should point it out. Finally, folk linguists have been important in the development of linguistics. Folk linguistics, like its cousin folk physics, gets things mostly wrong about language, but formal linguists have found important revelations in folk linguistics. There are elements of science, maybe not good science, in disciplines we usually associate with non-science.

If science and non-science cannot be easily demarcated, then we have no reason to think that philosophy - a discipline much more malleable than science - can be demarcated from other disciplines, like psychology or cognitive science. Philosophy informs psychology, so we should expect that psychology informs philosophy.

Like psychology, the research in experimental philosophy is empirically driven. Even if empirically driven experimental philosophy does not use conceptual analysis, we can think of it as a part of philosophy. Its findings should assist philosophy move forward. The discipline moves forward in fits-and-starts because of an increase in the knowledge- or information-base. Therefore, there seems very little reason to think that demarcating philosophy from non-philosophy and categorizing experimental philosophy as a part of the latter argues that we should think of experimental philosophy as not philosophy.

Tenured Professor Almost Dismissed

As I reported a few weeks ago (here), Ward Churchill, a tenured professor at CU-Boulder, has come under fire from the Colorado governor, the university's administration, members of the community, and fellow colleagues. Many of them have called for his dismissal. Only yesterday did the Interim Chancellor Phil DiStefano say that Ward Churchill should be fired because of his research misconduct.

People wanted Churchill fired for comments he made about victims of the 9/11 attack. (I'll spare the reader Churchill's vile comments.) But Churchill hid behind a thin veil of academic freedom claiming that it provided him with protection to make such comments.

These comments piqued an interest in Churchill's professional work. An exploratory investigation revealed that Professor Churchill had plagiarized some of his work and fabricated a story for one of his published articles. Also, some questioned Churchill's genetic ties to the Cherokee tribe. Since Churchill had used his Native American ancestory to gain tenure, they thought he would be dismissed for fraudulently claiming the heritage his own. The committee dismissed the ancestry charges, but it decided to pursue the other allegations.

The investigative committee recommended Churchill be fired because they found he had fabricated research and he had committed plagiarism. The university concurred. And the process of his dismissal is under way.

Brief editorial commentary:

Very few cases of research misconduct make it as far as Churchill's case has. But his case has made it this far because of all the hoopla surrounding it. The comments about the victims of 9/11 fueled a media frenzy. But the media frenzy has nothing to do with Churchill's dismissal. Churchill's attorney asked yesterday, "Is there any rational person who has followed this case that really believes this is not punishment for his 9/11 comments?" The 9/11 comment may have brought attention to Churchill, but he is not being dismissed for those comments. He is being dismissed for his research misconduct. The media frenzy made him an easy target, but he made himself an easy target by engaging in questionable research practices.

I say that Churchill should make the right decision and step down from his post at CU-Boulder. Engaging in an appeal will only anger his constituents, colleagues and community members alike, more than he already has. Most will view it as Churchill squeezing every Colorado taxpayer more tightly.

Professor Churchill, it is about time you take responsibility for your professional indiscretions, instead of seeking to blame others for your actions.

Ontology Under Construction

Who says philosophy, the hard stuff like metaphysics, has no application in the real (a.k.a. practical) world? Too often I hear philosopher's complain that metaphysics has no application in the world. Since we should not concern ourselves with matters that have no application, we should abandon metaphysics. Bah - I've always said. Now, I have a pretty dang good reason for saying "Bah"!

A major philosophical tasks of the mid-20th century was to show that ontology had to be a deserted landscape. It was supposed that if we were given the choice between a full-bodied ontology and one that contained just enough items to be a complete ontology, we would choose the latter. Whoever argued for this never tried to build an ontology in an IT department.

IT ontologies are not deserted landscapes. They are more like a swamp or a bayou - a real mess of information. Mostly everything counts as an object in the ontology, even items with which we have no physical contact. For instance, think of the license you have acquired for your favorite word processing or database program. We might think that there's only one object for which there might be a certain property, a license. But IT professionals usually count the license and the software itself as two distinct objects.

You might ask why the IT professional counts licenses as full-fledged objects. They are objects because you can buy 50 licenses of, say, Corel Word Perfect. That means the program can be installed on 50 end user machines. So, the physical media, the installation CD, matters very little to the IT professional. It's the license that permits them to install the program onto each machine.

If you've not figured it out by now, I've been hired by a local company this summer to build an ontology for their IT department. It's good money for very few hours per week. It's been quite thrilling to see how philosophy applies to real-world scenarios. Often, we IT professionals debate the relevance of some asset because there is no object with which it corresponds in our inventory. The asset itself is a sort of fictional object. It should be accounted for, but how ought we count it?

Granted, IT professionals don't have as much to say about the particulars of ontology from a theoretical standpoint. They have been very informative over how to individuate objects within an ontology.

Workshop conference on teaching philosophy

The 2006 A.A.P.T. workshop conference program is now available here.

The workshop conference will take place August 2 to August 6, 2006 at Washington and Jefferson College. Anyone planning to attend may register here.

Apparently, 'apparently' is evidential...

Per Matt Weiner's blog post of 6/21/06, "apparently" is evidential.

I'm unfamiliar with the topic of Matt's discussion. That's never stopped me from saying a quick word about it, especially since I think Matt's post is fascinating.

The term "apparently" reminds me of "evidently." I've noticed in conversation that people use the terms virtually interchangeably. So, I wonder whether Matt's suspicion arose from the synonymy of the two words.

That forced me to think about the examples he used. For example, to use Matt's example from his comment on the original problem, "evidently, Coolidge plays a gold-digging trophy wife, but really she plays a hairstylist." I think this sounds very strange, even more than "apparently." Does evidently modify "plays" or "Coolidge" or "a gold-diggning trophy wife"? If it modifies Coolidge, she is Coolidge; it is not that she evidently is Coolidge.

Postscript (6/26/06):
Matt has responded to my comment I left at his blog here. Let me try to replicate Matt's example with an example I've often heard in discussions of Wittgenstein. I'll modify it slightly.

A: "Apparently, I have two ears. Here's one and here's the other."

The question is whether A uses the term "apparently" incorrectly. There is clearly a problem with the sentence, but the problem could be the result of the language user not knowing how or when to reference his ears.

Think of a child who uses the word "him" instead of "he." The child asks, "where is him?" Even though the child has heard the question stated correctly, "where is he?", the child asks the question using "him."

Similarly, the person may have added the term "apparently" as a filler s/he thinks appropriate. George W. Bush does this often in speeches. It is not appropriate, but his search for the correct adverb to use fell flat.

Postscript (6/28/06):

What's the difference between "apparently, Joe agrees with this argument, as he's told me many times before" and sitting in your favorite bar or coffee shop that has a long line waiting to be served and saying "yeah, the line is long?"

Are motivating reasons just normative reasons?

I've been reading Alan Millar's "Reasons for Action and Instrumental Rationality," and I had to stop once he made a distinction between motivating and normative reasons. I know that this distinction has been made many times before. But, for some reason, it was in reading Millar's article that I had to take time to stop for a moment and to think about these two types of reason.

For the sake of discussion, let me outline the definitions of each kind of reason. I will use Millar's definitions (p. 114 of Reason and Nature, edited by Bermudez and Millar).

Motivating reason - reasons which move an agent to act and are therefore reasons by reference to which the action can be explained.

Normative reason - reasons which provide the agent who has them with a justification for the action in question.

Is there such a clear distinction between motivating and normative reasons for action? Maybe Millar goes on to question the distinction, but I've not reached that point. I'd like to try to argue that the two cannot be easily distinguished. Motivating reasons just are normative reasons.

If a reason moves one to act, then that reason is normative for the agent. For example, Smith goes to the grocery store because he wants eggs. The grocery store usually carries eggs. So Smith's is justified to go to the grocery store for eggs. His justification for thinking the grocery store carries eggs moves him to act, that is for him to go the grocery store.

I would never contend that this is always the way it is. Sometimes motivating reasons are not normative. For example, my desire for an ice cream may move me to go in any number of directions without being able to fulfill my desire. But, at least in some cases, motivating reasons are just normative reasons.

BYU philosophy teacher dismissed

Clark, author of Mormon Metaphysics, has written an interesting post on the dismissal of Jeffrey Nielsen. Jeff was a philosophy instructor at BYU. He wrote an op-ed letter to the Salt Lake Tribune (available here) criticizing the LDS Church's position on same-sex marriage. Jeff was "notified" four days after the op-ed piece was published that he would not be invited back to teach in the fall.

Clark points out it is highly likely that BYU did not renew Nielsen's contract because his views were perceived as an attack on Church leaders. Since the Church contributes a great deal of money to the university (probably greater than 95%), a consequence of Nielsen's comments is his being "let go" by the university.

Nielsen's story would frustrate anyone who has been an "employee at will" - or an independent contractor. Employing a person at will, e.g., all part-time work or full-time positions where an employee does not negotiate terms of a contract with an employer, is identical to Nielsen's situation. Employment at will is much more prevelant in private industry than we suspect. There are very few (if any) guarantees of employment at will. An employer can come into one's office and tell the employee to pack his things immediately.

Given the precariousness of temporary employment, it seems unfair for BYU to have dismissed Nielsen because he criticized a policy of his employer. Neither his teaching evaluations nor his research record played a major role in his dismissal. Teaching evaluations and research are the primary forms of evaluating an instructor's performance. Any measurement used other than two primary forms of evaluation will be considered an unfair practice. After all, Nielsen probably did not know (or realize) his personal views were a measure of his job performance.

Now for a reality check. The above argument is in a somewhat idealistic world.

Nielsen worked for BYU. Probably, his job description includes a clause that says something like "the instructor's views have to be consistent with the mission of the university." This implies that his personal beliefs cannot be inconsistent with BYU's mission statement. Since BYU's mission statement is a reflection of the Church's doctrinal beliefs, Nielsen's personal beliefs must be consistent with the Church's. His op-ed piece expressed an opinion contrary to the Church's beliefs. So, he breached an agreement he reached with the University, and the University has every right not to renew his instructorship.

What should we philosophers learn from Nielsen's experience? Nielsen's case is a good study for a business ethics class. In conjunction with that case study, an exploration of the conceptual similarities and differences between employment-at-will and academic instructorships should be undertaken. Finally, it is imperative that the APA investigate Nielsen's case and similar cases. If the APA discovers universities and colleges have unjustifiably dismissed instructors, then action - professional sanctions - should be taken against those universities and colleges.

The correctness of belief reasoning

According to John Broome (in "Practical Reasoning," Reason and Nature, p. 88f), the following argument constitutes a valid inference:

(1) Chris will buy a boat.

(2) For Chris to buy a boat a necessary means is for Chris to borrow money.

(3) So, Chris will borrow money.

He argues that if the first two propositions are true, then it follows that the third is necessarily true. The inference is valid. Valid inferences are correct forms of reasoning. So, the reasoning is correct because its content is a valid inference.

Broome's argument assumes valid inferences are correct forms of reasoning. After all, a valid argument is one where if the premises are true, then it is impossible for the conclusion to be false. Validity is a formal feature of an argument. If I can use a valid argument to show that not all valid inferences are correct forms of reasoning because of the formal features, then there might be reason to be suspicious of Broome's argument.

Either correct reasoning is a formal feature of an argument or correct reasoning is not a formal feature of an argument. If it is a formal feature of an argument, then valid inferences are indeed correct forms of reasoning. If it is not a formal feature of an argument, then valid inferences are not necessarily correct forms of reasoning. One could correctly argue using induction. For instance, one could infer that one nail is 2-inches long since all of the nails in the box are 2-inches long. The inference is correct not because of any formal characteristic of the argument. Thus, to think that the reasoning is correct because its content is a valid inference seems to eliminate other ways of reasoning correctly.

New Book Reviews from Metapsychology Online

Matthew Pianalto reviews Metaethical Subjectivism by Richard Double (available here). Pianalto writes, "Metaethical Subjectivism is written for philosophers working in ethics and requires a fair amount of familiarity with the contemporary literature in this field. Although I, too, am inclined toward a kind of subjectivism (a kind quite different than Double's error-theory), the moral seriousness with which we must decide what we should do (of which Double partakes in his repeated emphasis that he does care about answering the question, "What should I do?") seems to demand of us that we look for some kind of objective basis for our moral judgments, even if this foundation lacks the unity and pristine character which Double thinks realist ethical theories must possess." This summary suggests that Double's book addresses problems in theories of practical reasoning. One of the topics readers will have to be on the lookout for in reading the book is a bridging argument from metaethics to practical reasoning, which is something that Elijah Millgram seems to think is a tall order (see Ethics Done Right, Introduction).

Erich von Dietze reviews Kit Wellman and Andrew Cohen's Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics (available here). Von Dietze says, "The book is accessible, even to the non-philosopher, so long as the reader takes the time to grapple with each article and with the implications of what is being argued." The Contemporary Debates series is intended to be accessible to undergraduate students, and I think it succeeds in this task. One of the shortcomings of the book is that it focuses too much on traditional issues in Applied Ethics. The book is a contemporary introduction to traditional issues in applied ethics, but it is not a contemporary introduction to contemporary issues in applied ethics. Where are the articles on "augmentation" surgery?

Finally, Tatiana Patrone reviews Ronald Dworkin's newest book Justice in Robes (review available here). Dworkin's book attempts to tackle the difficult question over the truth conditions of propositions of law. By doing so, in Tatiana's own words, Dworkin "go[es] beyond the field of philosophy of law and reach to the areas of metaphysics, philosophy or language, ethics, and politics."

Quine's Notion of Paraphrase... Approximately

In From Metaphysics to Ethics, Jackson argues (44f.) that the modest role of conceptual analysis is analogous to what Quine had proposed about paraphrase replacing synonymy. Formulating a folk theory has served philosophers well but not determinate enough to think that it is exactly correct. Folk theories are modifiable (defeasible). What we want to accomplish is not synonymy with a folk theory but something like an approximate fulfillment.

Critics of conceptual analysis have assumed they have been seeking absolute certainty about folk concepts. We can never presume absolute certainty about folk concepts because intuitions are in constant flux. So, critics have begged the question against conceptual analysis.

I want to raise a different issue. By Jackson's own lights, I don't think we have a folk theory at all. An approximate fulfillment can be very far off indeed. One's intuitions about the folk may capture an "educated" person's view or an "uneducated" person's view (and perhaps something in between). If our view of folk intuitions fails to capture anything consistent with what the folk say, then it is not even remotely approximating a folk theory. There has to be some overlap between the philosopher's intuitions and the folks' intuitions for them to be compatible.

Nothing about my argument presumes any degree of certainty. Ultimately, if one avers that Quine's idea of paraphrase is analogous to formulating a folk theory, then that person has failed to articulate a folk theory. The folk theory is too far off.

Juneteenth

I found out today that Denver, Colorado hosts the largest Juneteenth celebration. I would never have figured that!

Juneteenth is an informal holiday that celebrates the end of slavery in the United States. Unfortunately, it is not a widely recognized holiday. On June 19, 1865, the last African-American slave was released by his white captors in Galveston, Texas.

Juneteenth commemorates African-American freedom. For more information on the holiday, visit http://www.juneteenth.com.

What were you thinking Phil?

Phil Mickelson, an extraordinary player by all accounts and currently ranked #2 in the world, lost another U.S. Open (Golf) Championship this evening at the famously difficult track known as Winged Foot Golf Club.

Winged Foot has been the site of some tremendous finishes in golf history. For instance, in the 1984 U.S. Open, Greg Norman sank an incredible 40+ foot putt for par on 18 to guarantee himself an 18-hole Monday playoff against Fuzzy Zoeller. When the Open Championship was played at Winged Foot Golf Club in 1973, the U.S.G.A. was determined to make the championship more difficult for players to score well. They had been embarrassed by Johnny Miller who had shot an amazing 63 at Oakmont in 1972. Hale Irwin won the '73 Open Championship firing a 287 7-over par. With a history like this, Winged Foot was surely going to be the scene of an incredible finish today.

What of this year? Mickelson all but had the trophy in his hand by the 70th hole (that is, the 16th hole on the final day of competition). But he heard that Montgomerie had birdied 17 to tie him at +4. The wheels began to fall off. Mickelson salvages a par on 17 from the middle of nowhere (way left of the fairway). Meanwhile, on 18, Montie hits the worst shot of his life (and I think Montie would agree with me here) and makes a double-bogey on the 450-yard closing hole. What does that mean for Mickelson? Finish with a par and you've won the 2006 U.S. Open.

What does Phil do? Phil pulls out his driver on the tee box. Using his driver, he had only hit 2 fairways all day. If he wants to win the U.S. Open, hitting his driver on the final hole is not the thing to do. He slices the ball way left (and I mean way left) of the fairway. The ball bounces off a hospitality tent onto hardpan rough in the tree line left of the 18th hole. The rough had been trampled all day by spectators and that makes the lie awfully tight. Two mistakes usually occur in this situation. Either the player hits it crisply from the lie causing the ball to fly very quickly with a great deal of forward spin missing his target by a long shot or the player chunks it in such a way the ball barely becomes airborne scooting down the fairway. Phil chunked it, hit a tree 30 yards ahead, and the ball comes to rest in a similar lie only 25 yards from where he had been. From this position, he has an open shot to the green. But remember what I just mentioned. There are two usual plays from the tight lie. He hits the ball crisply with an open club face and slices it into the bunker on the left side of the green. Phil now lies 3. He has to hole out from the bunker for par to win the Open. Ouch!

In the end, Phil makes 6 (double-bogey) and loses the Championship. Now we are all left to wonder: who is this Geoff Ogilvy and how in the world did he win the U.S. Open? Congratulations to Geoff!

Seeing Yellow Red

The referees at the 2006 FIFA World Cup have given out more than their share of yellow red cards. According to Globe & Mail (see article here), referees handed out 102 yellow cards and 5 red cards in the first 21 matches of the 2006 FIFA World Cup (4.9 per game). This is in comparison to 272 yellows and 17 reds in all of the 2002 FIFA World Cup action and in comparison to 98 yellows in 1982. In the U.S. v. Italy game today, the equivalent of three red cards were handed out. Only one clearly deserved a red card.

(For those of you who are not familiar with soccer, a red card is a type of penalty that ejects a player from the game. The ejected player cannot play in the next game either. The team plays "a man down," so to speak.)

The first red card was deserved. Daniele DeRossi (Italy) elbowed Brian McBride (U.S.A.) spliting his cheek open. McBride had to have 3 stitches to mend the wound. DeRossi later apologized after the game.

The second and third red cards were questionable calls. Both of them were received by U.S. players. I think that the red cards the US players received were the result of terrible judgments.

Pablo Mastroeni received a red card for a "cleats-up" tackle against Andreas Pirlo (Italy). Any other time and with any other referee Mastroeni would have received a yellow card for his tackle. Instead, the referee served him a red card.

Moments after beginning the second-half Eddie Pope received his second yellow card of the game, the equivalent to one red card. His tackle was clean. He won the ball, and - subsequent to winning the ball - he took down Gilardino. Once he won the ball, no matter what happened next should not have mattered. He took down the player because of the momentum generated by the play, but Pope did not deliberately (and maliciously) take down the Italian.

I suggest that FIFA officials review all of the games. If a referee makes a few questionable calls, then the referee should be relieved of his duties, and FIFA should reinstate the players. World Cup soccer is not a place for poor officiating. The World Cup is a place for the best players in the world to play their own game. Worrying about whether the referees will be making questionable calls should be farthest from their minds.

Teaching Business Ethics

Check out the complete story here.

Addendum:

Tsai's first line reads: "Last fall, Bentley College management professor Tony Buono taught a class on corporate scandals with colleagues pitching in from finance, accounting and even the philosophy department." One could interpret this as saying that members of the philosophy department are not equipped to handle the moral issues of corporate scandals and business. We are surely capable of discussing ethical theory, metaethics, but are we able to speak fluently about corporate scandals?

Battleground Vignette (A follow-up)

I've reconsidered my battleground scenario. It has some problems, but I still think it or something like it is promising.

The trolley problem presents the switch operator with a dilemma. Do I save the one and sacrifice the five, or do I save the five and sacrifice the one? Neither potential outcome is favorable because someone will die. But most favor the latter over the former. If I had to speculate why they answered in just that way, I would think that they believe that one person's dying for the five is a better option.

But I want to show that some trolley situations elicit a different response. I want to prove (in some weak sense) that a majority intuition is to sacrifice the five for saving the one.

In my battleground situation, I try to show that people are apt to respond by sacrificing the five to save the one. Many stories remind me of this reaction, e.g., Saving Private Ryan. Many people are sacrificed to save the one soldier. The battlefield is too emotionally charged. This is what makes it unlike the trolley problem.

I want to outline a less emotional example, but this one has its own problems. The vignette elicits a contradictory reaction because .

Mr. Gates is a billionaire, and he wants to invest $1 million in a particular business niche. In this niche, there are six businesses. Mr. Gates financial advisor tells him that an initial investment in Company A will require all of Mr. Gates $1 million. But an initial investment of $1 million in Companies B, C, D, E, and F will be able to be spread evenly across the five companies. A has the same number of employees as B, C, D, E, and F combined. If Mr. Gates invests in A, then B, C, D, E, and F will go out of business and all of its employees will be out of work. If Mr. Gates invests in B, C, D, E, and F, then A will go out of business and all of its employees will be out of work.

How strongly do you agree with the following statements?

It is morally wrong for Mr. Gates to invest in Company A.

It is morally wrong for Mr. Gates to refrain from investing in Company A.

If Mr. Gates invests in company A, then he will have saved the employees of company A.

If Mr. Gates invests in company A, then he will have forced the employees of B, C, D, E, and F out of work.

If Mr. Gates invests in company A, he will intentionally force employees of B, C, D, E, and F out of work.

The Modest Role of Conceptual Analysis

Jackson supports the modest role of conceptual analysis. When one wants to support the modest role of conceptual analysis, one does not make a claim about the way the world is.

The modest role of conceptual analysis hedges its bets against the folks' intuitions. Even if some philosophical theory were true, it would not change the way that folk view the world. Change, in the folk sense, is something more robust than the modest role can accommodate.

Jackson writes that the immodest role of conceptual analysis "gives intuitions about possibilities too big a place in determining what the world is like" (p. 43f).

What is so modest about claiming that change is different for the folk? What makes the immodest role of conceptual analysis a danger is that it stakes a very fundamental claim in an argument for the way the world is. In the modest account, Jackson claims that the folks' sense of change is more robust than a philosopher's sense of change. To say that some concept is more robust than another is a claim about the way the world is. Therefore, it seems that Jackson's own modest role of conceptual analysis accords with the immodest role.

If the modest role accords with the immodest role, then on one interpretation the modest role is identical to the immodest role. The modest account, thus, suffers from the same flaws as the immodest account of conceptual analysis.

Comment & Promissory Note

First, I want to announce that I do not moderate comments anymore. Blogger has a word verification feature which seems to have reduced spam to dust. Unless another serious problem with spam arises, I will keep comment moderation off.

Second, I promise to address Matt Mullins question, "What's so 'philosophical' about experimental philosophy?" in a future blog. I think this is an important question, and it is one on the minds of everyone who has been caught up in the experimentalist trend.

I've come up with several arguments, and I'll share them with you in a few days.

Some Quick Thoughts on Millgram's Method of Practical Reasoning

I have to review Millgram's method of pratical reasoning very briefly before I dig in my heels. Otherwise, nobody will have any idea what I'm talking about. Ultimately, I will contend that Millgram's argument for thinking the method is better than either form (wide or narrow) of reflective equilbrium contains two flaws.

The method of practical reasoning in rough outline is as follows. First, we should explore as many different theories of practical reasoning as possible. Second, we should determine which moral theory goes with some theory of practical reasoning. Third, we should find out which theory of practical reasoning is the correct one. Finally, once we have the correct theory of practical reasoning, we ought to adopt the moral theory that is paired with it. (Millgram's account of his method is much more finegrained, and he would probably object to my characterizing the stepwise outline as his "method of practical reasoning." Forgive me for the moment; I prefer the easy route.)

Millgram argues that reflective equilibrium has a built-in characteristic of complacency. After all, reflective equilibrium results in a theory that most of us will agree with. The Method of Practical Reasoning, however, gives you criteria upon which you have reason to act. One's reasons to act are not identical to one's opinions. For example, one might have a reason to x, even though that person does not want to x. The method, and I take it that Millgram thinks this is an upshot of his theory, motivates one to act contrary to his/her own opinion because s/he does not have reason to act. A theory of practical reasoning will tell us how we ought to act. Sometimes how we ought to act is contrary to our opinions. Thus, we will act in accordance with what our moral theory dictates, rather than just what our opinions is.

I agree that this is an ideal situation, but I think there are serious problems for Millgram's account to overcome. One problem arises from competency.

The problem is how would we know whether to trust that the theories of practical reasoning we survey are actually distinct from one's own opinion. If we adopt a theory of practical reasoning, the reason we adopt it is because it coheres well with our own opinions for reasons to act. If it didn't, why would we adopt it in the first place? There might be times when the theory of practical reasoning I adopt tells me to do something that, in my opinion, is contrary to the way I want to act. But if I give it some consideration, I'm sure that I'll find that all things considered the reasons for action cohere well with my fundamental goals. Thus, the upshot of the method Millgram cites is all things considered no better off than reflective equilibrium.

The second problem of Millgram's account is his insistence that one's opinion may be contrary to how one's theory of practical reasoning tells him to act. This is an intuition itself. It can be undermined by empirical data. If we collect the data and the data tell us something different, Millgram's premise falls flat.

Battleground Vignette

The intuition about the trolley problem is that the one person ought to be sacrificed to save the five people standing on the other track. Is there a way of rewriting the Trolley problem in such a way that the folk have the opposite intuition? I have always thought there have been ways of doing this, but I've not seen it done yet.

The vignette below tries to capture that intuition. I might have a different way of accommodating my vignette, but I thought the battleground scenario fairly appropriate. Comments are most welcome and greatly appreciated.

Here's a scenario that I think will do:

"Jones is a soldier in Smith's platoon. Smith's platoon is scheduled to go on a mission. Before the mission, Smith, a military officer, is notified that Jones's only brother had been killed in another operation. Smith tells Jones the bad news, but Jones decides to go on the mission anyway.

During the mission, Smith sees an enemy unit moving fast toward Jones's position. Smith knows that, if he does nothing, Jones will be killed. Smith can order five of his men to move between the enemy and Jones (call this position A). If Smith orders the men to move into position A, their moving into position A will draw fire from another location and all five men will be killed. But Jones will be able to escape and he will be saved.

Thus, Smith can refrain from ordering five of his men into position A, in which case Jones will die but the five other soldiers will not die; or Smith can order the five men to move into position A, in which case the five people will die but Jones will not die."

Questions (Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?):

It is morally wrong for Smith to order the five men into position.

It is morally wrong for Smith to refrain from ordering the five men into position.

If Smith orders the five men into position A, he will have saved Jones's life.

If Smith orders the five men into position A, he will kill the five men.

If Smith orders the five men into position A, he will intentionally kill the five men.

If Smith orders the five men into position A, he is morally responsible for the death of the five men.

DaVinci Code, Quick Follow-up

Jeremy Pierce commented (available here) that at the beginning of Dan Brown's The DaVinci Code, he wrote, "All descriptions of artwork, architecture, documents and secret rituals in this novel are accurate." I remember this, and I remember my reaction to the statement (even without reading a single line beyond it).

My reaction was, "Okay, but I need more evidence than merely a statement from the author. I am particularly skeptical of this statement given the subtitle, A Novel."

As Jeremy correctly points out in his comment, "it turns out that on all such matters there are all sorts of things he gets radically wrong."

There's a bunch of arguments we could make for or against Brown here. For example, descriptions are accurate ways of characterizing events or objects. Descriptions do not tell us anything about what to infer from these descriptions. Descriptions are not normative. Therefore, I now wonder whether Brown's novel is representative of a type of fiction or it is representative of a new and interesting perspective. There's a bit of equivocation on the word "novel" going on here.

The Folk Strike Back - Episode ???

Mark Phelan and Hagop Sarkissian have posted a very promising paper on the Experimental Philosophy blog (available here). I've only had a chance to skim the paper and the comments on the blog, but the results seem helpful for discussion surrounding the Knobe effect. I expect that they're onto something!

Jonathan Weinberg has challenged P&S on what they mean by "sensitivity." Basically, one could have a metaphysical or causal reading of the concept. Also, we might want to know what P&S mean by "central."

At first glance, I suggest that "sensitivity" refers to the individual differences one finds when a person queries subjects about why they answered as they did. If the use of a concept is sensitive to individual differences, then the concept of "intentional action" is interpreted in different ways by different people.

Therapeutic Heterosexuality

There's an interesting letter in today's Salt Lake Tribune giving some arguments against favoring same-sex marriage.

At one point, the letter writer argues as follows: "Further evidence [against the scientific underpinning of homosexuality] is found in the high success rate of therapy to help people with unwanted same-sex attraction re-orient to heterosexuality. While we may not understand all of the causes of homosexuality, if it was an innate characteristic like gender or race it would not respond to behavior-based therapy."

Therapy works in some cases. Why should we think that therapy shows that the genetic link of homosexuality is absent? Therapy works on the person. People are very plastic. They are able to adapt to many different situations. Perhaps what is going on is a suppression of their genetic predisposition. If this is so, then we should not think that homosexuality is not biologically based.

Jackson on Putnam's Twin Earth

In addition to the material I've cited on the side bar, I am working my way through some of Frank Jackson's arguments in From Metaphysics to Ethics. Here's one I've tried to piece together from p. 38f.

Jackson argues that Putnam built his case for the reference of theoretical terms out of intuitions that were "endogenous" to people. Since the agreement was the result of something within us, Putnam's Twin Earth example reflected a folk theory of water.

What I'm not sure of is Jackson's use of the term "endogenous." Is he referring to something innate? Or, is he referring to some natural characteristic we all possess?

If it is the former, then clearly the intuition is a priori. If it is the latter, then I don't think intuitions are clearly a priori (and I wouldn't bet on them being a posteriori either).

We don't know whether intuitions are spontaneously generated or not. They could have arisen because a person "woke up on the wrong side of the bed this morning." If there is a cause of one's intuition, then that intuition is not endogenous. It is hardly likely that only one person has exogenous intuitions. So, the agreement among individuals is not produced endogenously but exogenously.

What does this mean for conceptual analysis? There has to be other ways of assessing the concepts of the folk. Some of us, after all, must have disagreed with Putnam - even if his vuew seemed compelling for most. Therefore, stating that the agreement was endogenous is not enough.

It all comes down to taking the minority in Putnam Twin Earth cases seriously!

The Trials and Tribulations of Pneumonoultramicroscopicsilicovolcanoconiosis

(n). a lung disease caused by inhaling ultramicroscopic particles of sandy volcanic dust.

"Pneumonoultramicroscopicsilicovolcanoconiosis" is the longest word ever to appear in an English dictionary. For example, the word has appeared in the Oxford English Dictionary, Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, the Unabridged Random House Dictionary, and Merriam-Webster's Dictionary. Logologists have called it "P45" because it contains 45 letters.

There is some controversy over whether to call it the longest word to have appeared in a dictionary. First, the word is not in common usage. How many people have said, "Dang! I contracted neumonoultramicroscopicsilicovolcanoconiosis after visiting Hawaii"? The word is a technical medical term. Therefore, the term should not be considered the "longest word in general usage."

Second, the word is a hoax. The term was meant to show the "inflation" of medical terms, but there is no record of physicians or scientists using the term prior to 1935. Everett Smith, the man who had reportedly discovered the term, actually coined it.

Finding Religion

It is highly likely that I'll be teaching an upper-division philosophy of western religion class in the Spring semester of 2007. Since I've never taught the class before, I am trying to work out how I would approach the course. (I am getting started very early!)

First, should it be a class driven by lecture or discussion? I believe that a course of lectures will help give focus to the class. We will be able to cover specific issues in the philosophy of religion in as much time as I allow. Students comments may be more pointed because they will have had a chance to read it outside of class and hear it in class. The lectures will sacrifice the student's interests for my own.

Discussions will permit the students' interests to drive the course's content. I will be able to outline what I would like to cover in the course, but the discussion will regulate how much time I will allot to each topic. Discussion will sacrifice focus.

Second, how should I cover the topics in the philosophy of western religion? Since it is a western religion class, I will only cover the topics that come up in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. I could approach the class in one of two ways. On the one hand, I could cover it by topic, and, on the other hand, I could cover it historically. (There are probably other ways of teaching the class, but I've not thought about them.)

If I choose to do a topics-oriented class, then I think it is natural to cover the topics in the following order: the nature of God, Arguments for God's existence, the Problem of Evil, and Immortality. I have always been interested in each of these topics, and I think that students would be very interested in them as well.

If I do a historically-oriented class, then I think I would focus on medieval Christian, Jewish, and Islamic thinkers. For example, I might have students read Augustine, Aquinas, Maimonides, Avicenna, Averroes, and (possibly - if I'm feeling a bit fruity) Meister Eckhart.

The possibilities are endless for this class, and I'd like to hear what others have to say about teaching the class.

Much Ado About the DaVinci Code

I am sick and tired of hearing about the DaVinci Code. I realize that I getting on the bandwagon a bit late here, but it just keeps coming up over and over again.

Let me get something straight. I want to see the movie, but I don't want to hear any more about separating fact from fiction in the Code. The hoopla is much ado about nothing!

The DaVinci Code is a novel. A novel is fiction. Works of fiction are false, and very few statements in them are true. What little truth there is in the work has little to do with the story itself. So, the DaVinci Code is false.

I don't want to be told how to separate fact from fiction in the Code because any person who has a fairly decent vocabulary should realize that the word "novel" is associated with fiction. I don't see anyone teaching me how to separate fact from fiction in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.

When I teach a class, I like to let the students judge for themselves which way they would argue (e.g., for or against skepticism). When it comes to movies, people should be able to do the same thing. Let the people judge what to take from the film. We shouldn't force ideas on people!

Generalizing Intuitions

In talking about intuitions, Frank Jackson writes, "often we know that our own case is typical and so can generalize from it to others" (From Metaphysics to Ethics, 37). Basically, we think of a counterexample. Then, we postulate what someone would say in response to that thought experiment. Once we have formulated the response, we attribute our reaction to everyone. If our own case is typical, then we need not query people about their intuitions.

Here are two problems for Jackson. First, we are not typical. Our reaction to thought experiments have been jaded by years of specialized training. Specialized training persuades us to think about thinks differently. If our specialized training has changed the way we think about issues, then we cannot generalize to a popular audience. Our "intuitions" do not conform with peoples' intuitions. So, we have no justifiable reason to suppose that our intuitions generalize.

Second, a person could easily make false generalizations about one's own intuitions. For example, suppose that Smith has encountered four or five racists when she visited Memphis. From this, Smith generalizes, "all Southerners are racists." It may be true that the four or five people Smith encountered on her trip to Memphis were racist, but it would be hard to justify her inductive generalization covers all Southerners. So, even if our own case is typical, we should not generalize about them to others.

Comments Fixed!

First, I owe a debt of gratitude to Matthew Mullins for making me aware of the fact that the comments feature has not been functioning correctly.

This could be the reason why people have not been commenting on my work. (I'll say that that is the reason to make me feel better.)

Anyway, I've repaired the problem, and you are free to comment.

Remember, I do moderate comments. But I only eliminate spam comments, not critical ones.

What's so 'experimental' about experimental philosophy?

When a scientist wants to find out about the chemical composition of some gaseous substance, she runs a few experiments. But when a philosopher wants to know about peoples' intuitions, do they run experiments? (More forcefully, we should ask, "Should they run experiments?")

Technically, philosophers do not run experiments. But this assumes a very narrow definition of "experiment." Experiment, in this sense, is a set of observations performed to solve a particular problem or question. Galileo's use of a telescope to observe the moons of Jupiter circling the giant planet to further undermine the geocentric model of the cosmos is a good example of this narrow definition of experiment.

More broadly speaking, assessments of peoples' intuitions count as a type of experiment. The assessments are designed to elicit intuitive responses about moral, epistemic, or metaphysical matters. If peoples' responses do not correspond with a philosopher's hypothesis, then the empirical data collected undermines that hypothesis. Anytime the empirical data falsifies a hypothesis scientists will choose to support the conclusion the data support. Similarly, philosophers should support the conclusion the data support when it comes to testing peoples' intuitions. The observational data outweigh hypothetical guesses. Therefore, the assessments are experiments, in a broad sense of the term.

What could further support the argument that the intuition-mongering of experimental philosophy does not constitute an experiment? A promising argument would involve experimental design. One would have to show a serious flaw in the design of the experiments. If there is a serious flaw in the design of the argument, then the results one gleans from the experiment are worthless. So, we have to stop performing experiments. This is a promising argument, but it is one few philosophers make.

On Showing Restraint Toward Marines

Aaron Zundel, an editorial writer for the Daily Utah Chronicle, has opined that John Murtha and others have "sensationalized" the story about the 24 civilian deaths in the Iraqi town of Haditha. Very rarely do I speak out about politics, but flaws in Zundel's reasoning have compelled me to write a short rebuttal on behalf of those he thinks have "sensationalized" the story about the casualties.

Zundel has argued that since no one but those involved in the firefight know exactly what happened in Haditha, one should not jump to the conclusion that the Marines "simply went beserk and slaughtered civilians." He also thinks that the comparison with the My Lai massacre (Vietnam, 3/16/68) is unwarranted. I want to take issue with both of these points.

I will handle the latter first. Certainly, the scope of the My Lai massacre and the scope of the Haditha incident cannot be compared. 504 civilians were killed at My Lai. At last count, 24 died in Haditha. But there is an eery resemblance between the two events. Just as at My Lai where members of Charlie Company sought retribution for the death of their buddies, the Marines at Haditha had lost one of their own only moments before the "firefight" erupted in Haditha. Unlike Zundel, I would not call the similarities "speculation, conjecture, or hearsay."

Zundel's overall argument doesn't work either. Let's suppose that no one knows exactly what happened in Haditha. The fact is that 24 civilians died. The Marine unit was present in the town of Haditha, and the Marines were involved in a "firefight." Even if the Marines did not intentionally kill the civilians in Haditha, their actions, whether it be directly or indirectly, resulted in the deaths of 24 civilians. The killing of that many noncombatants is unacceptable, even if it is a case of "mistaken identity." So, their actions are morally reprehensible.

Action Theory (What's missing?)

I've noticed that there are very few good internet resources on action theory or philosophy of action. Perhaps I've missed a few. Please correct me if I have.

The best resource on action theory or philosophy of action is the Garden of Forking Paths. It's a blog, and it usually has good discussion going on there. Another blog associated with the Garden, the Papers on Agency Blog, posts papers in action theory.

The next best resource is Andrei Buckareff's webpage. It has a reasonably good bibliography of the philosophy of action literature, but the list of faculty members interested in action theory is dangerously out of date.

Elisabeth Pacherie's webpage has many good resources, but it doesn't seem as organized as Buckareff's website. Elisabeth's webpage resembles Buckareff's. The resources include a bibliography, an overview of puzzles about action, and famous quotations.

I don't mean to be critical of any of these websites, but it does show that there is room for improvement.

What is it for an account to agree with intuitive judgments "for the most part"?

In correspondence and in conversation with a colleague, we've been discussing "reflective equilibrium." (I've also been reading a great deal about it lately since it's an important part of my dissertation, but that is not important right now.) In particular, we seem to be hung up on the fact that those who endorse reflective equilibrium always emphasize that intuitive judgments are revisable.

Philosophers offer an account that agrees with our intuitive judgments for the most part. But I am always wondering what is going on in that phrase. Why for the most part? Don't we want an account that identifies intuitive judgments?

One may want to defend the qualification by arguing that there is no way to be certain that everyone would agree with one particular intuitive judgment. So, they argue that an account agrees with our intuitive judgments for the most part.

Similarly, the qualification will help one avoid the pitfalls of finding a single counterexample. In light of contradictory evidence, the method of reflective equilibrium stands its ground. By qualifying their account with a phrase like "for the most part," the philosopher can mold a theory that coheres well with background philosophical theories, political theories, and even theological beliefs.

I want to argue that the qualification does not limit the exposure of the philosopher to serious criticism. The qualification is meant to show that intuitive judgments are revisable. If intuitive judgments are revisable in just the way reflective equilibrium supposes, then the "for the most part" qualification is revisable too. The qualification is an intuitive judgment. So, the "for the most part" qualification is revisable.

When a person says to me that he "for the most part" agrees, it usually means that there are portions of my explanation that he disagrees with. What the person agrees with me on is the intuitive judgment, but s/he may disagree with the way that I've argued for/against that judgment. It seems to me that reflective equilibrium has missed its target (perhaps slightly).

The target is intuitive judgment. But if we understand the phrase in just the way we tend to use it, it turns out that we do not disagree about intuitive judgments but the way we argue for/against the intuitive judgment. If it is the argument that is at the heart of our disagreement, then it is not the intuitive judgment. The intuitive judgment stands (maybe come what may).

Since that is exactly what reflective equilibrium wants to undermine, it has missed the target. Reflective equilibrium does not post a qualification on intuitive judgment but on the argument that defends/criticizes the intuitive judgment.

Blog Update

Matt Mullins has called attention to the fact that I've become a more active blogger recently (see his post here). I'll presume that others have noticed too since my average daily visits increased nearly 97% in May, according to the Truth Laid Bear. It is interesting that I've become more active while most in the humanities have become inactive (see Mormon Metaphysics post here).

More posts are coming, including one later today on reflective equilibrium. (what is it? And why should we use it?)

As far as the blog goes, there are a few things I'm trying to do when I'm not thinking about a post, i.e., my dissertation. I'm trying to settle some logistic matters. First, I'd like to post what I'm reading (see Think Tonk's side bar under I'm reading...). I like to see what others are reading b/c it often gives me some idea of what they're thinking about. What they're thinking about gives me a clue for why they are posting the way they are. Analogously, I think readers would benefit from knowing what I'm reading. But I don't know how to post the stuff. Any ideas?

Second and reluctantly, I have to moderate comments. For a long time, my comments went unmoderated, and I received many spam comments. They posted and probably made some readers angry. If I moderate the comments, few (if any) spam comments will get through. I will not prevent any legitimate comments from being posted - even ones that are very critical or ones that are hostile. I'd like to set up something like what Matt has on his blog, but I'm not sure how to set that up using blogger.com. If anybody has any ideas, please share them with me.

Finally, I'm thinking about changing the design template of the blog, but I just don't want to take the time to save my hyperlinks, etc. I can be seriously lazy!

Canadien: the official-hey language of Canada

In a meeting I attended today, some sales personnel introduced new high-end organizational software. I found something quite interesting about the software's language scalability.

So that the software is open to international markets, users can choose one of the following languages:

English
Espanol
Francais
Deutsch
Canadien

Canadien? Yes, Canadien. I take it that software engineers want to accommodate the Canadien dialect of French, but I've never seen it as a part of a list of languages.

Given that the United States Congress has passed the bill that says "English" is the official language of the United States and given that software companies now seem to think that Canadien is a language option, perhaps this is as good a time as ever for the Canadian Parliament to revisit the issue of instituting "Canadien" as the official language of Canada - hey!

Parts & Wholes in Action v. Descriptions of Actions

Suppose that Smith pounds his fist on the table (No, Smith is not a philosopher). There are a myriad of ways to describe Smith's actions. For example, "Smith pounds his fist," "Smith moves his hand," and "Smith moves his hand swiftly." A minimalist about action will argue that all of these descriptions designate the same action. In other words, the description "Smith moves his hand" and "Smith pounds his fist" are identical descriptions of the same action.

(In A Theory of Human Action, Goldman has given many arguments to show why this theory is flawed. But I want to leave these reasons to one side for now. I want to address the similarities between the minimalist view and the view of action people like Thompson and Vogler have.)

Another way to describe Smith's fist pounding behavior is to say that there are parts of one action. For instance, in order for Smith to pound his fist it must move from position a to position b, from position b to position c, etc. The description "Smith moves his hand from position a to position b" is a part of the action "Smith pounds his fist." Thompson argues that there are an infinite number of parts of the action "Smith pounds his fist." So, it seems fair to say that "Smith moves his hand from position a to position b" is identical to "Smith pounds his fist," but it is not identical to "Smith moves his hand from position b to position c." This is the only recognizable difference between the minimalist view of action and Thompson/Vogler's view.

My view is that the Thompson/Vogler view is much closer to the minimalist view than it first appears. Even though they deny that two action descriptions designate the same action (which is to avoid one of Goldman's many objections to the minimalist), they do see that different action descriptions designate the same action. If two different action descriptions designate the same action, then each of these descriptions is identical to the one action. So, what Thompson/Vogler offer is a modified minimalist account of action that avoids the pitfalls of the Anscombe/Davidson view.