Is Truth the Goal of Science?

The main goal of inquiry seems to be truth. But this is not necessarily the case for science. Popper seems to have gotten something right about the nature of scientific investigation. It is not that we are justified in believing the well-confirmed hypotheses of our best scientific theories are true; rather we should believe that they are the best we have now. The hypotheses could turn out to be false, e.g. Einstein's theory of special relativity could be overturned by some other theory. So, it seems safe to say that the goal of scientific inquiry is not truth. It is to avoid falsity. For a long time, epistemologists - maybe less broadly speaking truth theorists - have given arguments saying that truth is important and that truth is what we all seek. But if science does not seek truth and if science is applied epistemology (unless you're a naturalized epistemologist of course), then it follows that truth is not something we have to seek. In fact, the contrary might be true. It's just that we want to avoid error! Anyway - these are just some preliminary comments for my reading for the week, Alston's ch. 8 in A Realist Conception of Truth, bits of Lynch's True to Life, and Marion David's article "Truth as an Epistemic Goal," in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty.