Why does the logico-linguistic approach to verisimilitude not work?

The prevailing assumption among philosophers of science, particularly those working on verisimilitude, is that all existing scientific theories are false but some are closer to the truth than others. So the story goes: a theory is closer to the truth than another theory if the first one has more true consequences and less false consequences than the latter. Nearly all of the definitions of verisimilitude suggest a formal metric for the distance from the truth. All of them fail. Why do they fail? The formality of verisimilitude involves a distance metric comparing two or more sets of sentences or sets of structures. The distance metric, however, is a relativized measurement from one theory or one model to another. The accuracy of the measurement depends on whether the set contains propositions that have been well-confirmed (this is a virtue of the verisimilitude debate). I want to argue that the formalities of verisimilitude fail to capture a normative or evaluative aspect of truthlikeness. The distance between two points does not reveal whether the distance itself is a 'reasonable' distance, a 'long' distance, a 'short' distance, etc., because these evaluative notions depend on lots of factors. For example, travelling between Salt Lake City and Denver by automobile is 'reasonable' because the total time it takes to go from one city to the other is about 6 hours. If we had to walk from Salt Lake City to Denver, then the distance would not be 'reasonable', walking would take a few days. Measurement can tell us about the physical distance between the two cities, but it does not convey anything about whether the distance is 'reasonable'. The distance between Salt Lake and Denver doesn't change just in case your walking or driving (It would if you were flying). Formal definitions of truthlikeness concern a quantitative distance between two theories or models. Just as in the case of 'reasonableness' above, the formality of truthlikeness doesn't capture the normative dimension. So, it seems that a distance-from-truth measure may not capture everything we want from truthlikeness.

Great Upcoming Conference!

The University of Denver Philosophy Department, in association with Carl M. Williams Institute of Ethics, is hosting an upcoming conference on the situationism debate in virtue ethics and moral psychology. For more details follow this link: http://www.virtueethicsconference.com/index.html.

Is philosophy therapeutic?

Wittgenstein has taught us that we have to appreciate philosophy as a kind of therapy. What does it mean for philosophy to be understood in this way?

Therapy usually involves a therapist, a patient, and a problem (from which the patient suffers). A natural question to ask is whether I am supposed to be the therapist or the patient? If I am the patient, what is my ailment? If I am the therapist, why am I justified in giving advice to patients? What's my problem? Is there a cure for my problem?

Suppose Wittgenstein wants us to think of ourselves as the patient. One might argue that the purpose of therapy will be to reveal to me the error of my ways, and the therapy will be a lesson in self-discovery. I will learn who I am through the therapist's interrogation. What I've just said presupposes that the therapy works correctly. If it doesn't reveal to me who I am, then I will not have succeeded in discovering myself. So, this discussion appears to imply that either I will learn who I am through therapy or I won't. In either case, I've attended the therapy sessions. But in the latter case the purpose of therapy has not been met. It seems fair to think that Wittgenstein wants us to appreciate the value of therapy through self-understanding, but maybe he doesn't want to suggest this at all. Maybe, it is attending the therapy sessions and failing to implement what one has learned from the therapist that is important.

Suppose, on the other hand, that Wittgenstein wants us to think of ourselves as the therapist. The therapist's role is as much about coming to understand him/herself as the patient. We have to presume that the therapist had some reason for choosing his/her career. We could say that s/he chose to become a therapist "to help people." If helping people is what a person wants to do in life, then everytime the therapist actually helps a person with an ailment s/he feels satisfied. Feeling satisfied seems to be a way of coming to understand oneself. So, it seems legitimate to think that the therapist - even though s/he may have greater command of the problem - too engages in the therapy.

Perhaps Wittgenstein's discussion of "philosophy as therapy" is not meant to raise the therapist/patient dichotomy; instead, he may have wanted us to focus on the actual therapy - the practice of therapy. I think this is important, but one's role in therapy seems no less important. One's role in the therapy - I think - will have a bearing on how one comes to understand him/herself.

2006 Intermountain West Student Philosophy Conference

The University of Utah Philosophy Department will host the Intermountain West Student Philosophy Conference again this year. I will not be the conference coordinator this year. Angie Harris - another graduate student in the department - will be. David Chalmers will be this year's keynote speaker and the conference will be held at the end of March/beginning of April. For further information, consult the Philosophy Department's webpage.