On Predictions

Suppose that someone, call her Mrs. NN, blurts out sentences like, "there will be a sea battle tomorrow" or "It will snow in Salt Lake City tomorrow" or "Charlie will choose both boxes." Mrs. NN does not intend to predict the future, but every time she asserts one of these sentences she predicts what will happen in the future accurately. In other words, the sea battle actually occurs tomorrow and it does snow in Salt Lake City. Taking stock of Mrs. NN's assertions we find that she is correct about future occurrences 99% of the time. Are Mrs. NN's assertion's predictions or are they just bald assertions? (Are bald assertions lucky guesses?)

A prediction is supposed to tell us about future events. Mrs. NN has sworn that her assertions are not predictions, even though they seem to be about future events. Mrs. NN could defend the claim that her assertions are not predictions by arguing that they are not about future events, but they are about some state-of-affairs not present. So, for e.g., the last sentence above is about Charlie, but it is not about Charlie's actions tomorrow. Or, the second sentence above is about Salt Lake City, but it is not about the weather in Salt Lake City tomorrow. So, her assertions are not about some future state-of-affairs.

This is weird because the assertion, "it will snow in Salt Lake City tomorrow," appears to be about the weather occurring in Salt Lake City. Apperance deceives us here, according to Mrs. NN. There are no future contingent statements for Mrs. NN because she doesn't talk about the future. There are only assertions.

The question is whether predictions are always about the future? I don't think so. Predictions can be about the past. In cases where someone says, "you'll see the error of your ways," the prediction is not about some future event, but it is about what you have done or failed to do in the past. The sentence does refer to some future time for me, but the content of the prediction has something to do with past events - "the error of my ways" events that have already occurred.

If predictions can be about something other than future events, then it is hard to see the force of Mrs. NN's objection. Predictions are not limited only to future events but they include past events too. So, Mrs. NN will have to take issue with predictions about past events. Mrs. NN's assertions seem to lack coherence.

Pedagogy of Charity

I've been thinking about philosophical issues in pedagogy for the past few months, but I've remained silent on the issue in my blog until now. In particular, I have been thinking about how to implement Davidson's principle of charity in the classroom. Here's my best stab at it for the moment.

Typical classroom practices, such as multiple-choice exams, activities that demand rote memorization, or summary over analysis, promote a pedagogy of severity. These exercises seem to treat students as error prone, incoherent, and irrational. An instructor uses these exercises with an expectation that students will fail. We see this in the way instructors write exams. A consequence of this pedagogy of severity is that interlocutors will not wish to communicate in a classroom environment. Discussion is stifled for fear of being humiliated in front of the classroom.

Charitable interpretation is a necessary precondition for understanding between interlocutors. Charity forces us to optimize agreement if we wish to understand others. Charity doesn't require everything a speaker says as true, but it does presume that false beliefs can be reconciled only against a background of widespread agreement. If we value a continuation of dialogue in the classroom, then we require a pedagogy that values and promotes the idea that others - especially students in the classroom - are rational beings with mostly true, consistent, and coherent beliefs. Thus, counteracting the harm of a pedagogy of severity requires a pedagogy of charity.

Desires and the "veil of ignorance"

The veil of ignorance ("VOI") assumes that a rational, self-interested agent will choose the fairest principle of social justice if that person does not know who she is, her social status, her ancestry, or her talents. Behind the VOI an agent does not know her place in society or know her ability to change society. Everyone is treated fairly and impartially because everyone is equally situated. The person will choose the most reasonable principle of social justice because everyone would accept and agree to the principle if they found themselves facing a similar choice under the same conditions.

Some desires are the product of social influence. For example, we might want x because our neighbors have x or we want to wear y because our favorite celebrity wears y. Human nature seems to be naturally social, and we draw likes and dislikes from those who surround us. Desires are rarely not a matter of outside influence.

If desires are not individualistic, then wanting one principle over another behind the VOI does not necessarily remove oneself from all outside influence. Wanting some principle is often a reflection of social influence. It might be the case that a rational, self-interested agent wants what would be best for her and others like her if they found themselves in the least well-off position. But this presumes that she interprets outside influence correctly.

We have to think that she might have misinterpreted what others desire. If she takes others to say that society ought to maximize the least well-off's position and she has misinterpreted others' desires, then she might be wrong to presume this is a good principle - for her and for others. So, there seems to be reason to think that there is no correlation between one's own desires and finding a principle of social justice using the VOI.

Apology to Viewers - APPENDIX

In a futile attempt to defend myself against Allan Hazlett's charges, I want to point out that someone should share in the blame for providing "misleading" and "scary" information. Fake Barn Country's URL is http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/blog. If the blog is not a departmental blog, then the URL is not proof of that. According to the URL, the blog belongs to the Department of Philosophy at Brown University. If we PING Fake Barn Country using DOS-command prompt, the TCP/IP resolves an address within Brown University.

No one should regard Fake Barn Country as Brown University Philosophy Department's official blog, but there is reason to think that the blog has something to do with the Philosophy Department (given the URL). Without a majority of graduate students and professors blogging, Fake Barn Country does not provide prospective students with a feel for the department. There are only 5 or so regular contributors to Fake Barn Country. Since 5 is not a good population sample of graduate students in the philosophy program at Brown, Fake Barn Country cannot officially (or unofficially) represent itself as Brown University's Philosophy Department blog or as Brown University's Philosophy Graduate Student blog.

So, we are left to wonder exactly what's going on in Fake Barn Country.

I think this incident is a lesson for all graduate students (probably just me since I'm the only one that reads these entries anyway) thinking about putting together a blog for their department. If they do not want to be associated with the Philosophy Department at their school in any capacity and they want to start a blog, then they should either (a) start a blog using blogger.com or (b) make up their own website (similar to what Matt Weiner and others do). This will certainly avoid confusion for blog readers.

Well, I think that 2 question remain: First, "do blogs belong to departments or the individuals that run it?" Second, "does the disclaimer provided at Fake Barn Country include web addresses?"

Disclaimers usually concern the content of the website. The content of the website include the views expressed by the website's authors. So, in this case, I cannot say that b/c Mr. X, a Brown graduate student said that p, Dr. NN, a Brown University faculty member, says that p. There's no correspondence in their views. The debate concerns whether the Fake Barn Country blog could also be considered the Brown University Philosophy Department Graduate Student blog. This seems to be a bit more complicated because there are many places with two or more addresses that work equally well. For instance, a person in Fayetteville, North Carolina can have the following addresses: 5225 Ramsey St. and 5225 U.S.401 South. If you've got something against the South, then there's another one. For example, a person (or business) can have the following addresses in Norwood, Massachusetts: 400 Providence Highway and 400 U.S. 1 North.

I guess that the problem is similar to Frege's "morning star/evening star" problem. The terms have different senses, but the same reference. So, Frege's sense/reference distinction applies to Fake Barn Country.

Turkey Buzz

I've not recovered from my turkey buzz yet, so I can't blog on anything substantive. I want to take this opportunity to preview next week's blogs: more on Buridan's Ass and Decision Theory, a post on Newcomb's Paradox, and (if I've the time) a post on The New Wittgenstein and other nonsense.

Anyway, gobble gobble and pass the remote!

Apology to Viewers

I would like to take this opportunity to apologize for misleading viewers about the hyperlinks I provided on the sidebar with the heading: "department blogs." It has only recently come to my attention that Brian Leiter and others have commented that providing a link with the name "Brown University's Philosophy Dept. or Syracuse University's Philosophy Dept." misleads the general public.

Allen Hazlett of Fake Barn Country commented:

"The reference at Oohlah's Blog-space (http://oohlah.blogspot.com/) to "Brown University's Philosophy Department Blog" is kind of scary, and (I think) misleading."

I had no intention to mislead my viewers or to scare them. If I did mislead anyone, I am profoundly sorry for doing so. I have taken measures to correct the situation.

Should anyone have recommendations about my blog, please contact me directly at oohlah at msn dot com.

2005 APA-Pacific

The APA-Pacific Program is now available at the University of British Columbia's philosophy department website. For ease of reference, I've provided a hyperlink by clicking here.

As usual, the Programming Committee has included a lot of great colloquium papers, invited symposia, and "Author Meets Critic" sessions - including one on Michael Lynch's True to Life (MIT, 2004).

Can we perceive values?

Mackie has argued that we cannot perceive objective values. These values are metaphysically strange, and even if there were objective values, we would have to have some special sort of intuiton.

The claim that we cannot perceive objective values because we do not have the special sort of intuition seems to presume something about the limits of perception. We can sense natural things. Objective values are something unnatural. So, we cannot sense objective values. This seems to be the gist of Mackie's argument.

The problem is that acknowledging the limits of perception sounds like an objective claim. Here is the way I see it: Either we can sense things or we can't. The things we can't sense are to be discarded. We cannot sense objective values. So, objective values are to be discarded.

When we say things like, "the things we can't sense are to be discarded," or "we can sense natural things," we suppose that there are clear boundaries between what we can sense and what we cannot sense. The clear boundaries guide us in our decision to do something. Setting the boundary, however, involves expressing an idea that is outside of the boundary. So, if we understand what the proposition says, then the proposition itself is to be abandoned as well. In Mackie's case, we not only give up "objective values," but also "objectivity" - generally.

Sorry everybody...

Via Feministing.com, I found this interesting website filled with people expressing their dismay over the outcome of the 2004 election. I wonder whether the authorities will attempt to track these people down.

Feminists Unite!

A new blog called Feminists Blog acts as a clearinghouse for self-identified feminists, womanists, woman liberationists because blogs are not just for boys.

Is truth objective?

This blog will start a series on Michael Lynch's new book True to Life (MIT Press, 2004). Simply, I think it is a great book, so that's why I have to comment on it and criticize it. He uses the following simple argument to show that truth is objective (p. 10):

1. If I know something, then I know that I don't know everything and neither does anyone else. (premise)

2. There are some things we won't ever know and there are things we think we know but we don't. (premise)

3. So, truth is objective. (1,2)

It is hard to believe that from our ignorance it follows that truth is objective. I have to reasons for my complaint: (1) our ignorance only proves our fallibility not truth's objectivity and (2) the argument presumes a special understanding of objectivity.

First, I agree that there are things we won't ever know. For example, we will never know what the last day on Earth will be like, whether there are impossible objects, or how many licks it takes to get the center of a Tootsie Roll Pop (well, maybe we'll know that eventually). And, there are things we think we know but don't. For instance, we think we know that Iran already has weapons of mass destruction, but do we really know that? Anyway, this shows that we are ignorant. Ignorance is not knowing what the facts are. It could also include not being able to ever know something. This is a far cry from something being objective. The most we can infer from these facts is that we don't know a lot. Objectivity is surely more than expressing something about our limited cognitive abilities.

Second, if the objectivity of truth were to follow from the first two premises, then we might think that truth's objectivity is presumed in the premises of the argument (particularly 2). The presumption is that we're ignorant. Ignorance proves that truth is objective, so truth is objective. It is a part of our ignorance that shows truth to be objective. So, Lynch may have begged-the-question here.

My main complaint is that truth's being objective doesn't follow from the premises. Even if it did follow, then the argument seems to presume truth's objectivity in the premises. Hopefully, Lynch will expand this argument later in the book.

New trend for academic journals?

Every country and/or continent has a journal bearing its name, e.g., European Journal of Philosophy or Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Why not include Antarctica? The Improbable Research Blog has pointed to a new journal, the Antarctica Journal of Mathematics.

The journal publishes original papers in all branches of Mathematics. The website features detailed instructions for potential submitters to follow. One requirement is for authors to suggest two names of Indian referees. The question is whether the suggested referees have to have some connection to Antarctica?

This journal may usher in a new age of academic journals and would make it the right time to start a philosophical journal bearing the southern arctic continent's name. The inaugural issue could include articles on the ethics of cryogenics and the practical importance of the T-sentence, "snow is white iff snow is white." The subtitle of the Antarctic Philosophy Journal could be "braving the elements."

The spectacular pictures of Antarctica's native penguins make the journal's webpage more appealing and much more delightful. Any journal that posts pictures of indigineous wildlife is a journal for me!

Chapell on (well, not literally) Buridan's Ass

Richard, author and mastermind of Philosophy et cetera, has offered an interesting diagnosis of the problem of Buridan's Ass (choice without preference). I think that his response reflects current orthodoxy on the problem. But Richard has put a unique spin - one that I've not encountered before - on the problem. He has incorporated cognitive science to show that since cognition comes at great cost, an agent should use it sparingly. That means circumventing the problem of Buridan's Ass because the costs outrun the benefits.

Utah has a football program?

While I try to keep non-philosophical blogging to a (bare) minimum, I can't help but gloat over the success of Utah's football team. Utah's season closes this weekend at home against rival BYU. Utah is undefeated (10-0) for the season - including 6 conference wins - and boasts a dominant offense beginning with the efforts of Heisman Trophy nominee quarterback Alex Smith. For these reasons (I take it), they are ranked #6 in BCS standings, behind powerhouse teams like Southern Cal., Oklahoma, Auburn, Cal., and Texas - programs that are expected to be among the top in the country.

Alex Smith (QB) dominates every game and scores one touchdown for every 10 minutes of playing time. So, it is only natural that Alex Smith is a contender for the coveted Heisman Trophy. Ridiculous note: Ironically it has been over 60 years (Bruce Smith, 1941) since anyone with the last name "Smith" has won the trophy - maybe this is the year another Smith will win it - and (I think, though I might be wrong) almost 20 years since anyone with the last name "Smith" has been nominated.

Many argue that Utah shouldn't be ranked as high as #6 because they haven't played the "good" teams. Well, all I have to say is look at the track record of the teams the Utes have played. For instance, Utah whooped North Carolina, and North Carolina beat Miami. So Utah would have torn through Hurricane country had they played Miami. Do I even have to bring up Texas A&M. There will always be skeptics, but Utah's success is not an illusion.

Maybe this year people (like, friends from Ole Miss) will stop asking, "Does Utah have a football program?" Go Utes!

Picking and Random Devices

Some decision theorists and practical reasoners have thought of similar ways around the problem of Buridan's Ass, choice without preference. For the practical reasoner, an agent ought to just 'pick' one of the two bales of hay. For the decision theorist, an agent ought to use a random device, e.g., flip a coin, draw lots, etc., to settle the matter.

It has occurred to me after reading some of the literature that no one attempts to draw the similarities or differences between the two solutions. I take it that picking an alternative without a clear preference for it is similar to using a random device because what the outcome is depends on chance.

The problem is that picking one alternative does not seem to be leaving much to chance. The agent settles on choosing one of the bales of hay, picks it, and consumes it. This doesn't seem to leave as much room for chance as there would be if the agent had flipped a coin or rolled a die. So, picking may not be a random maneuver.

So, it seems that a similarity between picking and random devices is not clearly demarcated.

Does Mackie rely on a mysterious intuition?

This blog is partially a response to an email correspondence with another thinker - who will remain nameless for the moment - and an extension of my previous argument. The problem in my account seems to be that I attribute to Mackie an intuition equally mysterious to the one he rejects.

Mackie is an empiricist, and he wants to deny (1) that there are such things as objective values, and (2) even if there were such things as objective values, we could not know them because we would have to have some queer form of moral intuition.

The problem with Mackie's empiricism is that if he is right that we have no special intuition that allows us to access objective values, then he must have a good command of what we can perceive and not perceive. Good command of perception involves knowledge of perception. Mackie's empiricism would be able to tell that bacteria are perceivable with the use of a microscope, distant galaxies are perceivable with the use of a telescope, and medium-sized objects are perceivable using only the naked eye. His judgment that he cannot perceive objective values comes from not being able to experience them in the way we can perceive distant galaxies, bacteria, or medium-sized objects. But we don't seem to have good command of perception - for e.g., we can mistakenly think that we see a round tower in the distance (it's actually square). So, we seem to have a reason to think that just because we cannot perceive objective values doesn't mean that they do not exist or that we cannot intuit them.

Mackie's argument wants to say that things that are objective cannot have any influence on us. If they have no influence on us - particularly through the senses - then we have no reason to think there are such things. This works very well against objective values. If we haven't seen 'em, then they're not there.

This argument, however, works equally well against Mackie because he has presumed that nothing other than experience guides our ethical thinking. Since we cannot perceive objective values, they cannot guide our ethical thinking. The empiricism Mackie invokes is an objective concept. If empiricism is an objective concept, then he defeats himself. There is nothing that can be objective because that would mean it is beyond our perceptual capacity.

Philosophers' Carnival V

The new philosophers' carnival is posted at Ciceronian Review. Philosophers' Carnival, a creation of Richard Chappell's, is an opportunity for lesser known philosophy bloggers to gain exposure and to attract a wider audience.

One of this month's featured blogs is Metatome, a blog dedicated to discussing pedagogical issues in philosophy.

Here is a hand...

There are two tripartite epistemological arguments floating around. What I want to know is whether the two arguments say the same thing. Both could be attributed to Moore - but that is debatable.

First:
1. If I am a brain-in-a-vat, then I don't have hands.
2. Here is a hand, and here is another hand.
3. Therefore, I am not a brain-in-a-vat.

Second:
1. If hands exist, then there is an external world.
2. Here is a hand, and here is another hand.
3. Therefore, there is an external world.

The second argument seems closer to what Moore said in "Proof of an External World." But why should we think that the two arguments differ? After all, they both seem to want to deny that there is not an external world.

One reason someone may think that the two arguments are different - perhaps very different - is that the first argument proves too much. It's conclusion is a "general statement as to how any proposition [like here is a hand] may be proved" - to use Moore's words. He admits that his proof cannot possibly cover general statements.

Another reason someone might think that the two arguments are different - and, to my mind, this is the clearer way of thinking about the difference - is to say that the first argues that we are not brains-in-a-vat and the second argues that there is an external world. The first conclusion implies that there is an external world, but it doesn't argue for it straigthforwardly. The second conclusion argue that there is an external world without taking into account skeptical worries.

These reasons for thinking that there are two different arguments seem shoddy at best. But should we conclude that the two arguments are identical - that they prove the same amount of information?

"Logical Aliens"

Frege uses the example of logical aliens to show that if we can think of them arguing, inferring, and thinking, then they must be thinking, arguing, and inferring in way compatible with traditional logic. There cannot be a realm beyond logic in which we can say that arguing, inferring, and thinking take place. So, the idea of logical aliens cannot be maintained.

Wittgenstein argues against Frege for two reasons (1) he gives up the idea that logic consists in laws of thought that can be entertained as true or false and (2) we cannot say that the logic we use is the correct logic for everyone.

What I want to take up against Frege is the idea that we have a clear understanding of the boundary or limits of thought. The argument against the idea of logical aliens says that there cannot be a realm beyond logic in which we can say that arguing, inferring, and thinking take place. This assumes that we have a clear understanding of all the laws of logic. The laws of logic tell us what logic consists in. Anything not accounted for by the laws of logic is beyond the realm of logic. But this seems to negate the idea that we could discover news laws in logic. For example, tomorrow we could discover a new law of logic, something like saying p and I believe that p is equivalent to p and not-p. The boundary between what we understand logic to be and what it could be seems ill-defined. If the boundary is not clear cut and allows for the discovery of new logical laws, then logic does take account of a realm beyond logic. So, we can maintain the idea of logical aliens - contrary to what Frege would have us believe.

Blogs - something for all and none

I have asked some people why they don't use blogs to express their ideas/arguments? Some answers stem from their lack of computer knowledge, while others say that a blog is just a way to inflate one's ego. It is a way to show how smart one is. (Or, in my case, it is a way to embarrass myself.) The support for the last comment comes in two forms: (1) people actually read blogs and (2) bloggers actually care that other people read their blogs.

How many people actually read blogs? Blogs are a fairly recent development, and they are not widely publicized. For instance, it is relatively rare to perform a a google or yahoo search that returns weblog hits. In cases where I searched for something philosophically related that I knew would have concerned a blogger at one time or another, there were very few - if any - weblog hits returned. So, people may not actually read weblogs because they would have to go searching for weblogs using engines with which they are not familiar.

Do bloggers care that other people read their blogs? My guess is that some think it is important for others to read their blogs, but others may disagree. I, for one, don't care who reads my blog. I think of blogging as a means to exercise my writing. For bloggers to care whether others are reading their blog is to think that what they have to say is important. But we each have our own interests, and our own interests may or may not coincide with others' interests. So, what we say is important to us but we cannot claim that others should find the same material equally important. If we cannot claim that others should find our interests important, then bloggers should not really care whether other people are reading their blogs.

ASL at APA-Pacific

The 2005 spring meeting of Association for Symbolic Logic will be held in conjunction with the APA-Pacific in San Francisco. For further details, see the announcement available at this University of Calgary webpage.

Richard Zach, of LogBlog fame, is a member of the program committee.

One of the special sessions might be of interest to graduate students. The special session's title is: "Logic Instruction and Philosophy Graduate Training." The session will include the following speakers: Andrew Arana, Michael Glanzberg, Delia Graff, Ted Sider, and Richard Zach.

Brief comment: The status of logic in U.S. graduate programs has deteriorated quite a bit over the past few years. Graduate programs offer courses in symbolic logic, decision theory, modal logic, and set theory. But graduate programs counsel students not to concentrate in areas related to logic. I take it that the programs suggest students not to take up logic for several reasons, but I will leave my response to those reasons for another blog.

Always on My Mind

I've reached that point in the semester where it is important to start thinking about what I'm going to do next semester (and beyond). As always, I am thinking about topics for a dissertation. But I'm also thinking about running a reading group. Some of the books I've been thinking about reading include the following:

Stanley Cavell, Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the Moral Life
Michael Lynch, True to Life
Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good
Ken Stanovich, Who is Rational?
Paul Thagard, Coherence in Thought and Action

If anyone suggests one over the other, then please write a comment about what you think of the book.

Blogging Expectations

Blogs are a place to try new ideas. Some ideas work well; others don't. For most of us, blog writing does not come ready-made for publishing in an academic journal or, for that matter, in a periodical, like a magazine or newspaper. Most blogs are roughsledding. Blog writing is more of an exercise in writing and thinking, than in trying to write something of publishable quality.

Some blogs do not contain very good arguments (as I've been made very aware of by anonymous). The purpose of comments is not to bash the writer. I take the purpose to be to help the writer work out the kinks of the argument, to make the argument stronger and more forceful. Criticisms are acceptable (encouraged in fact) so long as they are well argued and sound -- without blatant fallacies. Constructive criticism assists the writer become more aware of his/her opponent. But criticism should not have the tone of "my way or the highway."

No good writing -- i.e., worthy of publishing -- has ever come of a first draft. What blog writing is is nothing other than a pre-first draft -- a place for setting out new ideas. It's not even good enough for paper.

For further information about blogging etiquette (something we should all follow), see Brian Weatherson's piece "On Blogging Etiquette" available at his blog.

Objectivity in Mackie, Revisited

I want to revisit an argument I raised a few months ago concerning Mackie's queerness argument. Mackie offers a metaphysical argument and an epistemological argument against moral realism. My concern here will be Mackie's epistemological argument. It goes something like this: even if there were objective moral values, we would have no way of knowing about them. Since they are not natural properties or reducible to natural properties, ordinary perception does not let us perceive them. So we have no way of knowing anything about them without positing some "intuition" that seems too odd to be acceptable.

Mackie is a someone who believes that perception is the basis and foundation for knowledge. The only things we can perceive are natural properties and objects. If there are objective values, then they cannot be perceived at all, are mysterious in nature, and cannot be known by us. But the problem with Mackie's account is that the force of his argument depends on objective values having no influence upon us. For instance, we can think of perception being the impression of objects on our senses. Objects "influence" our senses in order to be perceived.

If objective values were objective in this way, then we could not know anything about things that were objective. We cannot apprehend something objective. If we cannot apprehend something objective, then objectivity is beyond our comprehension.

One of the characteristics of objectivity is that it is objective. Mackie has already said that we cannot perceive things that are objective because they have no influence upon us. So, the result is that Mackie's argument, if it is indeed correct, works against not only objective values but also objectivity.

Political cartoons and free speech

In this election, there seems to have been a disguised attack on free speech. It had this tone. If you're not in agreement with what we, your government, is doing, then you're no better than a terrorist. Disagreement with the government is politically motivated and the result is a political divide.

Terrorism has been defined in many different ways, but what the government has done is redefine to include anyone who is "politically motivated" against noncombatant members of a sovereign nation. The redefinition has been (to a large extent) successful.

So, the government may perceive any politically motivated threat as terrorism. If this is true, then things like "sit-ins," "civil disobedience," "failing to pay one's taxes," or "political cartoons" are forms of terrorism. Obviously, someone will argue that there is a limit to what we term terrorism. But the question is where do we draw this line? What is to prevent that line from moving toward these smaller, less egregious forms of "terrorism?"

Construction Causes Mass Chaos at Oohlah's Blog-Space

I've decided to revamp my blog. In the process, I've lost everyone's comments because I switched from haloscan comments to blogger.com comments. Well, blogging goes on.

Are conservatives environment-friendly?

In today's Daily Utah Chronicle, Edward Stevenson tries to set us liberals straight about the environment. Here are a few things he had to say in the matter:

The first problem he addresses is what he terms the fight between human welfare and conservationism - conservationists want to "lock up" resources for future generations to benefit while this is bad for human welfare. He writes: "If we need it now, why should we curb our consumption for future generations who will probably have better technology and less need for the resources?" If he's serious, then he sounds like Butthead talking to Beavis. You would expect that snide laugh to chime in just after reading it.

Ulatowski: Mr. Stevenson, you've missed the boat. Why should we force problems on future generations if have the opportunity to fix them now?

Stevenson: Uhhh, ha ha, ha ha, uhhh, uhhh, that's, uhh, uhh, like stupid.

The second problem he addresses is land management and leaving nature alone. He tells of a story from Dixie National Park (in Utah) where environmentalists blocked the use of pesticides to kill a species of beetle. The beetle was killing the forest, so he thought that that justified the use of toxins against the pests.

I'm surprised at this conclusion, especially since he seems to be a self-avowed conservative. Does Mr. Stevenson realize that he is acting as God in destroying the species of beetle? Conservatives respect God because He is the Creator of the universe and all things in it. By destroying one of His creations, aren't we disrespecting God's dominion over the living? Mr. Stevenson has failed to see this implication in his view.

Also, the chemicals could have killed more than the beetles. It could have killed indiginous wildlife - including plants and animals. Ecosystems are not to be messed with. So, we should keep our hands clean of tinkering with the fragile ecosystem as much as possible.

Is choice without preference an important problem?

In the first chapter of Jon Elster's Solomonic Judgments, he argues that choice without preference is not an important practical issue. He contends that no one cares which of two apparently identical soup cans on the supermarket shelf is chosen. The only way a choice like this will matter is if there are differences in the two soup cans, i.e., one has more broth than the other, etc.

I may have missed the point, but the problem of the choice without preference is that we can choose either soup can A or soup can B and satisfy our desire for buying soup. Since both soup cans will satisfy our desire, then rationality tells us to purchase both soup cans. If we think like this, though, we could potentially become poor very quickly. (Perhaps using the example of very similar cars on a new or used car lot would bring the problem to the fore.) So, it is not rational to purchase both cans. What seems to follow is that reason tells us to do something it is not rational to do.

Have I missed the point of choice without preference, or has Elster missed an important component of this difficult problem?

Meta-Blog on Blogger.com

This is a question to those of you more familiar with weblog services. I have found that blogger.com does not have as many features as I would like, e.g., it doesn't list recent comments. I know typepad is an alternative foundation, but does it have more features than blogger.com offers? Is it reliable? Is it easy to use?

Any help would be greatly appreciated.

New Blog, yet again

Blogs are a dime-a-dozen these days (particularly in the world of academic philosophy), but I really like the name of the new blog at the Western Michigan Philosophy Department - Undetached Rabbit Parts.

Would Quine have approved?

Is Logic Normative?

There are at least two facts that philosophers uphold with regards to logic: it's normative and it's necessary. But what does it mean for logic to be normative?

The first candidate answer is that it says people should reason in accordance with the laws of logic. If this is the way logic is normative, then why do we have so much to do with it? After all, the claim is that "people" should reason in accordance with logic. This seems to be a claim about us, not logic. If it is a claim about logic, then it should have nothing to say about what we should do. If it is a claim about us, then it should have nothing to say about whether logic is correct or incorrect. That logic is normative seems askew.

Is Pornography a Form of Rape?

There are various forms of pornographic media available, including magazines, videos (DVD, VHS, or online media), and online chat rooms. Traditionally, we've thought of pornography as consensual between the subject (man or woman) and the person who purchases the material.

Rape is nonconsensual sexual intercourse and usually involves force or deception. Some cases of rape occur at random. A man takes advantage of a vulnerable woman - perhaps he sees her walking in a dimly lit alley. More often than not, we hear of cases of "date" rape. "Date" rape involves a person who though trusted by the other takes advantage of that person by forcing him/her to take a drug. Once the drug takes effect, the person rapes the drugged person.

I want to challenge the idea that pornography is consensual. If it can be proven that a woman or man does not consent to her image being used for pornographic purposes, then s/he has been raped.

Pornography involves taking pictures or videos of one person or a couple. Picture-taking and video-making are commonplace in today's society. On any given day, one can see pedestrians taking a picture of a monument in town or taking a video for a child's birthday party. When some activity becomes commonplace, it is hard to distinguish between common occurrences in life and something that requires careful consideration before engaging in the activity. For instance, television sets were once very expensive and required a great deal of consideration before a family purchased one. Nowadays, it is common for families to purchase a television without due consideration. So, we could say that in the case of photographs and videos the situation is analogous to purchasing televisions: though it was once a novelty to be photographed or videoed, today with the greater accessibility to high-tech cameras and video-cameras taking photographs or videos is commonplace.

Taking something as commonplace fails to see the activity as significant. Having your picture taken for all to see is a significant because of the wide distribution of the photographs. But nobody will be able to recognize the picture taking as significant because it has become commonplace. So, something significant is dismissed as commonplace.

Suppose a man or woman was approached by someone who asked if they wanted to have their pictures taken for money with the one side-note that they had to be photographed naked. Since today we don't see taking photographs as commonplace, they will not consider the consequences of their decision before accepting the proposition. A part of consent is to fully understand the implications of one's actions. Since the man or woman has not understood the consequences of the act, s/he has accepted without consenting. So, taking pornographic photographs of someone is a kind of rape.

New Blog on Teaching Philosophy

There's a new blog, called Metatome: Watering the Roots of Philosophical Practice, that discusses pedagogical issues in philosophy. Check it out!

Motivating Psychologism

Psychologism - the view that the correct way to figure out logic is to think about the mind - rarely gets proper attention, at least since the time of Husserl and Frege. Husserl and Frege's arguments condemn psychologism to the philosophical trash heap. I want to explore the motivations for psychologism. If no motivation is available, then there's no reason to take up psychologism.

Inferences are hard to cash out using only logic. Logic reveals the way that inferences run, and it shows that this-or-that inference is correct. What logic doesn't show is why we ought to accept that inferences must work that way. Some might choose to deviate from the inference deemed correct by logic, but still come up with the same conclusion. So, we need not necessarily follow the rules of a priori logic to get something right about inference patterns. If we don't need a priori logic for making correct inferences, then the way the mind works might be able to inform us about logic. Thus, the way the mind works will inform us about logic; psychologism is the correct account.

On "Prediction" in the Predictor's Paradox

Suppose that a very reliable “Predictor” presents Smith with two boxes, one open and one closed. In the open box, there is $1,000, and the closed box contains either $1 million or nothing. Smith has to choose between taking either both the closed box and the open box or only the closed box. If Predictor predicts that Smith will take only the closed box, then it contains $1 million. If Predictor predicts that Smith will take both boxes, then the closed box contains nothing. Which course of action ought Smith choose?

I want to introduce a distinction by what we mean by “prediction.” There are two ways to understand prediction. In the first sense, prediction is a sixth sense. Those with this ability are reliable predictors if they fail to make incorrect predictions most of the time. In this type of prediction,information goes back in time. In the second sense, prediction is occurs when a person observes regularities in nature and predicts an outcome of a situation based on this experience and the principle of the uniformity of nature.

Prediction in the Predictor’s paradox is not usually taken up in the first way. There is a decisive argument against it. Prescience is to have foreknowledge or foresight. For example, Ms. Cleo and other clairvoyants possess prescient knowledge because they can see into the future. What this type of prediction involves is information traveling back in time. If I can show that time is unreal, then this type of prediction seems impossible.

If time is real, then things must be past, present, or future. An event has the property of being past, present, or future, and these properties are temporary rather than permanent. For example, if an event is present, then it will not always be present. The properties of past, present, and future involve a contradiction. So, nothing can really be past, present, or future. Therefore, time is not real.

Should this be a correct analysis of the Predictor's Paradox, Smith can choose either just the closed box or both boxes.