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McGinn on Identity. In Logical Properties, Colin McGinn argues (well, he endorses) that identity is (i) unitary, (ii) indefinable, (iii), fundamental, and (iv) a genuine relation. There are at least two arguments I want to consider as a response to McGinn's four theses.

First, McGinn endorses the idea that identity is unitary. By this, he means that the relation x has to y when x is nothing other than y, when there is no distinction between x and y, when x is y. Identity admits of no qualification or variation from the way that we have defined it. Let me try to dislodge our belief that identity is unitary, that it requires no qualification. I think that there is reason to qualify identity in at least one way (if not more). Consider the following: '4 = 4'. This is clearly an identity statement where the number 4 is equal to the number 4. But, it is a different kind of identity statement than the following: 'the red house at the corner of Sunnyside and Arapeen = the red house at the corner of Sunnyside and Arapeen'. The first statement is a mathematical identity statement, and the second statement is an empirical proposition. Is there anything else that distinguishes the two propositions? It seems that the identity of the former is stronger than the latter. For example, the truths of mathematics are not bound by time and spatial constraints in the same way that the red house is bound by them. No matter where we find ourselves in the universe 4 will always equal 4, but the red house at the corner of Sunnyside and Arapeen will not always stand as identical to itself. For instance, we could burn the house down. No longer will the red house be the red house, but it will be a pile of rubble that was the red house.

Is the pile of rubble identical to the red house? Many people will say that the pile of rubble is different (significantly so) than the red house. The pile of rubble used to be the red house. The red house has changed into a pile of burning embers. Is this possible for the number 4? The number 4 will always be the number 4, and nothing else. We could uphold some sort of fantastic social convention where the number 4 is actually the number 5, but McGinn eliminates this option because this would be more like a language game (family resemblance concept). At no point can we set the number 4 afire. Even if we could set the number 4 ablaze, who would believe that the number 4 had become a pile of rubble? There is clearly a distinction between identity statements. If this is the case, then we have no reason to uphold that identity is a unitary concept. In fact, we may have different conceptions of identity based upon our psychological make-up. (This is where we pick up Mill's System of Logic and read it -- seriously.)

The second objection I would like to consider presses McGinn's endorsement of identity as a genuine relation. Toward the end of the chapter (p. 12f), McGinn tries to show that he can undermine Wittgenstein's belief that identity is a pseudo-relation. I think this is gravely mistaken. Wittgenstein's point is not that identity is a pseudo-relation, in any rich sense. Wittgenstein merely wants to say that identity is nonsense. By nonsense, Wittgenstein seems to mean that there is nothing informative that such a proposition can tell us. Identity relations, tautologies, and contradictions are all nonsense for the early Wittgenstein. What can ``the red house is red'' really tell us? According to Wittgenstein, this is a ridiculous claim. Likewise, saying that ``the red house is identical to that red house'' is even more ridiculous. The sentence says nothing at all. Mightn't we extend the notion of nonsense to similar concepts than identity relations, tautologies, and contradictions? Possibly, but that I am working on in a larger paper. For now, it is enough to say that McGinn has mischaracterized Wittgenstein's claim.

After reading McGinn's chapter on Identity the first time a few years ago, I had no quarrels with his 'endorsements'. After further review, I have reason to doubt that identity is much more contentious than McGinn or Frege suggest. I have other arguments objecting to the two remaining concepts, but I will leave that for another time. The point of this entry is to question what to McGinn (and to many others) might seem like a harmless chapter.

Queer Eye for Mackie. Perhaps the easiest objection to Mackie's argument is that he begs the question. For instance, we can deny that we do not have a special sort of intuition which enables us to discern different objective values. We have this intuition, and nothing that Mackie or any of his cohorts says will convince us otherwise. Too often, philosophical arguments end like this -- a stalemate. Is there any way for the objectivist to argue without ending the argument in a stalemate?

Let me offer a few alternatives. First, to my mind, Mackie should suspend judgment about the special epistemic capacity with which we acquaint ourselves with objective values. He denies that we have the epistemic capacity to know of objective values. In denying that we have the epistemic capacity, however, he must know what the epistemic capacity is. Knowing what the epistemic capacity is permits Mackie to deny that we have it. If he has denied the existence of the epistemic capacity without knowing what it is, then he risks making the same error. He has called on some unusual faculty of mind that allows him to intuit what epistemic capacity does and does not exist. If he is doing this, then he commits the same error as the person who accepts the existence of objective values.

Second, the real question for Mackie is how we arrive at our moral beliefs. There may be alternative ways of arriving at moral beliefs than through our intuition. For instance, I am reminded of the way Aristotle proposes one becomes virtuous. According to Aristotle, acting virtuously is a matter of habit. We learn how to behave appropriately and we habituate this sort of activity. We can learn what the moral principles, and we have the capacity for moral sentiments. We have to dedicate ourselves to constantly revising the way we act and how to act so that it is in accord with the moral principles. The underlying problem here is how we arrive at our moral beliefs and that they are justified moral beliefs. The way that I want to explain away the underlying problem is that moral beliefs do not guide our action, but it is our judgment that guides our action. So, it doesn't really matter whether we have moral beliefs that correspond to something but it does matter whether we judge that there are moral beliefs.

Third, the emotivist or prescriptivist may come to the rescue of the objectivist. Mackie's argument depends upon the truth of the premises guaranteeing the truth of the conclusion. He writes that we cannot be aware of the truth of these ethical premises without some special sort of intuition. The objective emotivist may claim that Mackie has not considered that statements like, "lying is wrong" fails to be a proposition with a truth-condition. This sentence may only express the sentiments of the speaker. If the statement is merely an expression of the speaker's commitments, then it fails to concern the truth or falsity of the premises. The clear-headed objectivist then need not resort to a special sort of intuition. Objectivism turns out true.

Mackie's Argument from Queerness. Mackie argues that if values are objective, then moral properties are queer in the sense that they are different than any other sensible property. If moral properties are queer in this way, then we need a special faculty with which we become acquainted with these properties. We don't have a special sort of faculty, like moral intuition. Thus, there are no objective values.

In this blog, I want to address the epistemological dimension of the argument from queerness. First, the argument is nothing new in philosophy. In fact, the argument reflects the sort of anti-realist argument we see in the philosophy of mathematics. No matter what I do or what I say cannot convince the anti-realist of the existence of numbers or the moral anti-realist of the existence of moral properties. What I can do is provide a negative argument against the anti-realist position. Even if we had some sense of moral intuition, we would still wonder whether that allowed us access to moral properties. Our sensory apparatus allows us to perceive the world. Sometimes this apparatus fails us. For instance, we think that we see a round tower in the distance when it is actually a square tower. When we submerge a straight edge into the water, it appears to bend. Despite the clarity with which our senses present the material world, we have no reason to believe that it presents us with what is actually there before us. Thus, no faculty is able to give us access to the material world, and no explanation of a faculty (regardless of whether it is a natural explanation) permits us to say that x is a moral property.

Frege-Geach Point and Expressivist Theories: On Affirmation. Valid deductive arguments concern the truth of the premises and how these premises logically entail the truth of the conclusion. In the example, (A) and (B) logically entail (C). Suppose we replace (B) with (B1): ``It's wrong to tell Bubba to enslave someone.'' The premises (A) and (B1) would not logically entail (C) because (A) and (B1) would not guarantee the truth of (C). So, the Frege-Geach point depends on the notion of validity to prove that ``It's wrong to enslave another human being'' means the same thing in (A) and (B).

Validity requires truth-value. Since expressivists want to avoid saying that moral judgments have a truth-value, it is unlikely that their notion of validity would look anything like validity in the way Geach and Frege portray it. How might an expressivist explain validity? Expressivists might want to say that validity is nothing more than commitment to the premises psychologically entails commitment to the conclusion. We may then be in a position to accept (psychologically speaking) one or the other premise without also accepting the conclusion. We may be committed to (A) or (B), but not both. Endorsing the proposition ``it's wrong to enslave another human being'' in the asserted context need not mean the same thing in the unasserted context, especially since we define validity differently. Thus, expressivism is not necessarily wrong because we can indeed have distinctive expressive meanings in asserted and unasserted contexts.

Frege-Geach Point and Expressivist Theories (Second Pass). Logicians define a valid deductive argument as an argument in which it is impossible for the conclusion to be false given that the premises are true. The truth of the premises guarantee the truth of the conclusion. Expressivists deny that a moral judgment has a truth-value. Moral judgments merely express the attitude of the speaker. For instance, when an expressivist (particularly Hare) says, ``Lying is wrong,'' we do not mean it is true that lying is wrong but ``don't lie'' or ``lying, bahhh.'' To say that ``it's wrong to enslave another human being,'' according to the expressivist, is not to affirm the proposition in the way we affirm whether some state-of-affairs obtains. Affirmation conveys how one feels about a proposition, but it is not the case that the expressivist affirms the truth-value of the proposition. Since affirmation has only to do with expressing an attitude of approval or disapproval, affirming a conditional involves a distinctive expressive meaning. The validity of the modus ponens does guarantee that the proposition `it's wrong to enslave another human being' means the same whether or not the sentence occurs asserted or in unasserted context, but validity is a moot concept for expressivists. Expressivists do not care about truth or falsity; they care only about attitudes in moral judgment. Thus, (A) and (B) may mean the same, but claims about (A) and (B) may be different since the claims express the attitudes of the speaker toward (A) and (B), individually.

Frege-Geach Point and Expressivist Theories. Suppose we have the following valid modus ponens argument: (A) If it's wrong to enslave another human being, then it's wrong to tell Bubba to enslave someone. (B) It's wrong to enslave another human being. (C) Therefore, It's wrong to tell Bubba to enslave someone. According to the expressivist theory, (B) expresses an attitude of disapproval towards slavery when the sentence is affirmed. (B) has a distinctive expressive meaning. In (A), (B) occurs in an unasserted context and by affirming (A), no attitude of disapproval towards slavery is expressed. Somebody who affirms (A), affirms a conditional and does not express an attitude of disapproval towards slavery. Thus, `It's wrong to enslave another human being' does not have a distinctive expressive meaning in (A). The validity of the modus ponens inference shows that `It's wrong to enslave another human being' means the same whether or not the sentence occurs asserted or in an unasserted context. This is the Frege-Geach Point. Thus, (A) cannot have a distinctive expressive meaning when affirmed on its own.

An objection might be raised against the notion that the expressivist theory implies that (B) can be affirmed or not. The whole point of expressivist theories is to disarm whether (B) has a truth-value or not. Affirmation of a proposition implies the truth of the proposition. The only thing we can say about (B) is whether approve of or disapprove of it. When we say `It's wrong to enslave another human being' on its own, we express our disapproval of slavery. When we say the same sentence in a conditional or disjunctive statement, we express our disapproval of the antecedent or we express our approval of it. We can approve of or disapprove of propositions that fall in the antecedent or consequent of a conditional statement. We would only need to substitute variables for each elementary proposition in the argument to see that we express the same thing in the conditional as we do outside the conditional. Thus, expressivism is not wrong -- at least not in the way that the Frege-Geach point implies.

Welcome to Oohlah's blogspot. Oohlah is new to the blogging neighborhood. Topics of discussion include the evolutionary roots of rationality, metaphysics & epistemology, philosophy of mathematics and logic, nonsense, and early analytic philosophy, especially the works and thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein.